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Abstract
Mindfulness and mindlessness are often theoretically and psychometrically
treated as opposing poles of a single dimension (e.g. Langer, 1989; Kabat-Zinn, 1990;
Brown & Ryan, 2003). The present study examines the possibility of two differing
styles of mindlessness, an oblivious form based upon defensive avoidance of experience
and a reactive form based upon ruminative reaction to experience. These differing styles
of mindless are theoretically similar to adult attachment status. The avoidant attachment
style is conceptually related to an oblivious style of mindlessness in that both involve a
defensive denial of certain aspects of experience, particularly those aspects that evoke
feelings of vulnerability or emotional distress. The preoccupied adult attachment style is
similar to the reactive style of mindlessness in that both involve a hyper-focus on
emotionally distressing experiences and a subsequent affective destabilization. Given
these similarities, the present study explored reactive and oblivious mindlessness by
examining the interaction of mindfulness and adult attachment status. Adult attachment
status is profoundly related to autobiographical narrative (e.g. Main, 1996; Mikulincer &
Orbach, 1995). Accordingly, narrative measures were used to explore the relationship of
attachment status and mindfulness.
Among participants with a preoccupied attachment status, mindfulness predicted
decreased emotional articulacy. Among avoidant participants mindfulness predicted
decreased emotional articulacy and increased complexity of representations of self and
others. In contrast, among secure participants mindfulness had no relationship to
narrative measures. These results suggest that mindfulness functions as a protective
factor against the distressing rumination associated with emotional articulacy among
iii

those with an insecure attachment status. They also provide preliminary support for a
theory of reactive and oblivious mindlessness and highlight the value of further research
examining the interaction of mindfulness and attachment status.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Mindfulness based interventions have been effectively incorporated into an
increasing number of psychological interventions for a diversity of physical and
psychological disorders, and yet little is known about mindfulness itself, the construct at
the heart of these interventions. In contrast to this overall state of ambiguity, Williams,
Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, (2000) have demonstrated that mindfulness is associated
with increased specificity of autobiographical memory. In order to provide greater
conceptual clarity into mindfulness, this study aims to further explore the relationship
between mindfulness and other aspects of autobiographical memory, specifically qualities
of autobiographical narrative.
Clinical Applications of Mindfulness Based Interventions
The first therapeutic application of mindfulness to receive rigorous empirical
examination was Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), a
secularized and manualized application of Buddhist meditation techniques applied first to
the treatment of chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). MBSR was originally focused on the
psychological problems that co-occur with physical illness and has successfully alleviated
symptoms of pain, stress, and depression associated with a number of medical problems
including heterogonous types of cancer (Speca, Carlson, Goodey, & Angen, 2000), breast
cancer (Tacón, Caldera, & Ronaghan, 2004), traumatic brain injury (Bedard, et al., 2005),
and fibromyalgia (Weissbecker, et al., 2002). Since then it has been applied to a wide
range of psychological problems. Patients with life long affective disorders reported
decreases in state anxiety, depression, and ruminative thought after completing an MBSR
1

program (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004). Unlike many treatments, the
effects of MBSR are not short lived. For example, three years subsequent to the
completion of a MBSR program, medical patients previously diagnosed with anxiety
disorders continue to show significantly reduced levels of anxiety (Miller, Fletcher, &
Kabat-Zinn, 1995).
The benefits of MBSR are not limited to clinical populations. MBSR has also
been proven to lead to decreases in levels of pain and stress and increases in positive
states of mind in a sample of the general population (Chang, et al., 2004). It has reduced
feelings of stress and other symptoms of burn-out among healthcare professionals
(Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & Cordova, 2005). Several studies have documented the
benefits of MBSR for medical students including decreased psychological distress
(Rosenwieg, Reibel, Greeson, Brainard, & Hojat, 2003) and increased empathy (Shapiro,
Shwartz, & Bonner, 1998). A recent meta-analysis found an effect size of .5 for the
mental and physical benefits of MBSR across both clinical and non-clinical samples,
providing further validation of MBSR’s efficacy (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, &
Walach, 2004).
Mindfulness techniques are also being integrated into treatment programs for a
number of other difficult-to-treat psychological disorders. Mindfulness Based Cognitive
Therapy (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) applies a combination of MBSR techniques
with more traditional cognitive techniques to treat recurrent major depression. It
repeatedly has proven to significantly reduce the rate of depression relapse above and
beyond cognitive therapy alone (Segal, Teasdale, & Williams, 2004; Ma & Teasdale,
2004). Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) is a promising treatment
2

for borderline personality disorder that has been demonstrated to lead to decreased anger,
depression, hopelessness, suicidal behavior, and days in the hospital (Smith & Peck,
2004). DBT incorporates mindfulness training in order to promote affect regulation and
to facilitate the development of “wise mind” which is an intuitive synthesis of “emotional
mind” and “rational mind”.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy incorporates aspects of mindfulness
training to facilitate clients’ accurate perception and acceptance of their own life and
experience and has been successfully used to treat a broad range of psychological
disorders (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, in press). Currently several
researchers are including mindfulness techniques in the treatment of generalized anxiety
disorder because they argue it will alleviate anxiety related to future worry and deepen
interpersonal and emotional contact with events (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Borkovec &
Sharpless, 2004). Mindfulness techniques have been used to facilitate affect management
in post traumatic stress disorder (Wolfsdorf & Zlotnick, 2001). Mindfulness meditation
has also been used to significantly decrease binge eating among adult females with binge
eating disorder (Kristeller & Hallett, 1999).
Going beyond the evidence of psychological and behavioral benefit, there is
increasing documentation of the physiological changes caused by regular mindfulness
practice. Recent research on the effect of mindfulness meditation indicates that daily
practice of such meditation leads to increased immune functioning and increased brain
activity in the left prefrontal cortex, a brain area related to the experience of positive
moods (Davidson, et al., 2003). This finding held true even when the participants were
not actively meditating during the brain imaging process and were no longer involved in
3

meditation training. Meanwhile, recent research on the brainwaves associated with
mindfulness has identified an increase in fast theta power in the frontal area as indicative
of mindfulness, as opposed to concentrative meditation. This pattern of brain activity is
correlated with increased internal awareness and decreased reward seeking and
punishment avoiding behavior (Takahashi, et al., 2005). This study provides evidence
that mindfulness is a distinct and observable state of consciousness with identifiable
physiological correlates separate form other meditative states (e.g. concentrative forms
like transcendental meditation).
Despite the wealth of evidence, reviewed above, of the psychological and
physical benefits of mindfulness meditation, the field is only beginning to develop an
empirically based understanding of what mindfulness itself is and how it is related to
other psychological constructs (Bishop, 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 2003; Grossman, et al.,
2004). Specifically, little is known about the mechanisms responsible the clinical gains
associated with increased mindfulness. An exception to this is Williams, et al., (2000)
study, pointing to increased specificity of autobiographical memories as a potential
mechanism behind Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy’s proven effects on depression.
The authors review evidence that patients suffering from depression, suicidal ideation,
and posttraumatic stress disorder all have greater average percentages of over-general
autobiographical memory. Among a depressed population, greater percentages of overgeneral memory predicted increased number of both past depressive episodes and prior
suicide attempts (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). Furthermore, increased percentage of overgeneral autobiographical memory predicts longer duration of psychological illness
(Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993). Williams (1996) theorized that reliance
4

on over-general autobiographical memories reflects an attempt to avoid painful or
traumatic specific memories by remaining at the more general and less emotionally
charged, categorical level of memory. This avoidance however ultimately may serve as a
vulnerability to further depression as it associated with deficits in social problem solving,
difficulty imagining specific future scenarios, and also hopelessness (Williams, et al.,
2000). Williams (1996) describes this propensity for over-general memory as a trait like
disposition, present early in life and serving as a psychological vulnerability to mental
illness. Williams, et al., (2000) demonstrated that Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy
reduces rates of relapse among patients in remission from major depression and reduces
the proportion of generic autobiographical memories, and increases the proportion of
specific autobiographical memories. They predicted this effect because the mindfulness
homework required in MBCT requires patients to notice specific aspects of their
environment, which would seem likely to reduce overly generic encoding. Furthermore
MBCT specifically teaches patients to allow mental events without judging or trying to
change them, which would seem likely to mitigate depressed patients’ typical active
avoidance of specific memories. They posit that this change in specificity of
autobiographical memory may be a potential mechanism by which mindfulness protects
against depression relapse.
Autobiographical Memory and Narrative
This study intends to further the basic understanding of mindfulness itself by
extending the investigation of the relationship between mindfulness and specificity of
autobiographical memory to the relationship of mindfulness and other qualities of
autobiographical narrative. Although Williams, et al. (2000) focused on autobiographical
5

memory, this study will focus more specifically on autobiographical narrative.
Autobiographical memory and narrative are very closely related constructs. Both terms
have been used in diverse and often times synonymous ways, and there is no clear
distinction between their operationalizations within the literature. For example,
Williams, et al. (2000) measured autobiographical memory by providing participants with
positively and negatively valenced cue words and then asking them to provide a
description of a specific event from their past of which the cue word reminded them.
Baerger and McAdams (1999) measured life narrative in an extremely similar manner.
They described eight universal critical life events (e.g. a high point, a low point, a turning
point, etc,) and asked participants to describe a specific event from their past that fit the
description of the critical event.
Orienting autobiographical memory and narrative within the greater context of
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) Self Memory System (SMS) model clarifies their
relationship. The SMS model posits that autobiographical memories are actively
constructed out of three specific types of autobiographical knowledge: life time periods,
general events, and event specific knowledge (ESK). ESK are often visual imagery and
consist of the direct sensory memories from the experience as opposed to the cognitively
and linguistically based representations of the experience. Within this model
autobiographical memory is an active cognitive synthesis of various specific ESKs within
the greater context of life time periods and general events. Similar to Singer and
Salovey’s (1993) self defining memories, autobiographical narrative is a subset of
autobiographical memories that have specific relevance to the sense of self (Robinson &
Taylor, 1988). Other types of autobiographical knowledge, like the life story schema
6

(Bluck & Habermas, 2000), seem to play an important role in defining which
autobiographical memories are included in the autobiographical narrative.
Autobiographical narrative is also distinguished from simple autobiographical memory
by its story like quality, which is related to the idea of coherence, an important aspect of
narrative that will be addressed in a later section. This study will draw on literature about
both autobiographical memory and autobiographical narrative; however, it will focus
primarily on narrative due to the wealth of techniques for quantifying different qualities
of autobiographical narrative and due to the empirically demonstrated relationship
between narrative and essential psychological functions, like maintaining emotional well
being and establishing interpersonal relationships.
In contrast to autobiographical memory, autobiographical narrative also is by
definition a social behavior: a story telling behavior affected by the social context,
specifically the relationship to and qualities of the listener and the narrator’s implicit
culturally bound story telling traditions. Alea and Bluck (2003) demonstrate that a
narrator will tell a different narrative depending on the qualities of the listener (e.g. a
child vs. an adult) and his or her relationship to the listener (an intimate friend vs. an
unknown researcher). Narrative also is structured according to certain culturally defined
traditions of what a good story is, and would likely be structured differently in another
culture (Murray, 2003).

For example adults from independent (e.g. North American)

cultures told earlier, lengthier, and more elaborated autobiographical narratives than
adults from interdependent cultures, such as China, Korea, and India (Leichtman, Wang,
& Pillemer, 2003).
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Therefore the subject of interest in this study, autobiographical narrative, is
recognized to be a complex construct; a given autobiographical narrative is an active
cognitive synthesis of ESKs contextualized according to overarching forms of
autobiographical knowledge, such as the life story schema, all of which is woven together
into a culturally bound story structure appropriate to the specific social context.
Mindfulness could affect narrative in a number of ways, including the encoding of ESKs,
the construction of life story schemata, the retrieval of ESKs from long term memory for
use in a specific narrative, and the interpersonal story telling process. In order to make
more specific predictions about the relationship of mindfulness and narrative,
examination of the relevant literature on the constructs of mindfulness and
autobiographical narrative will be necessary.
Development of Mindfulness Theory
Returning first to mindfulness, a theoretical understanding of mindfulness will
allow for specifying its expected relationships with narrative. The concept of
mindfulness has its roots in ancient Buddhist teachings. The first known historical
reference to mindfulness provides only an indirect definition of mindfulness itself.
Several early Buddhist documents state simply that mindfulness (smriti) should be
cultivated by awareness of four basic aspects of experience: body (kaya), feelings
(vedana), thoughts (citta), and the basic elements of the world (dharma) (Kalupahana,
1987). Thus early Buddhist writings imply that mindfulness is a state of intentional
awareness of one’s physical sensations, emotions, thoughts, and environment. Over a
thousand years later, mindfulness meditation techniques have been further refined, but
are still at the heart of many Buddhist traditions. Typically, they entail sitting in an
8

upright posture and focusing the attention on the physical sensation of the breath. As
thoughts and feelings distract the attention, they are accepted and observed before being
released to return the attention to the breath (Tich Nhat Hanh, 1976). This acceptance
and observation of all aspects of experience defines mindfulness meditation in contrast
to concentrative meditation, which simply focuses on ignoring and ultimately reducing
distracting thoughts and feelings so that greater and greater single pointed concentration
can develop (Martin, 1997). Modern Buddhist definitions of mindfulness have remained
quite similar but now include a more explicit temporal focus. For example Tich Nhat
Hanh (1976) defines mindfulness as, “Keeping one’s consciousness alive to the present
reality” (p. 11), and Nyanoponika Thera (1972) defines it as, “The clear and singleminded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive moments of
perception” (p. 5).
Scientific psychology first began to investigate mindfulness because of increasing
awareness of its opposite: mindlessness. Social scientists have gathered a large body of
evidence chronicling the variety of human behavior that occurs automatically and without
conscious awareness. Reviewing this literature, Bargh and Ferguson (2000) cite
numerous studies in which environmental cues, of which participants are unaware,
strongly influence participants’ information processing, judgment, and behavior. Ellen
Langer, one of the early researchers of automatic or mindless processing conducted a
number of experiments illustrating the mindlessness of myriad human processes,
including complex social behavior (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978) and social
perceptions and judgments (Langer, 1980). Her research on mindlessness encouraged her
to begin theorizing about it’s opposite: mindfulness. Langer (1989) defined the three key
9

qualities of a mindful state as the creation of new categories, the openness to new
information, and the awareness of more than one perspective.
Scientific psychology began to incorporate mindfulness related concepts and
techniques from the Buddhist tradition when Kabat-Zinn (e.g. 1982, 1990, 2003)
provided repeated empirical evidence of the psychological benefits of a secularized form
of mindfulness meditation. As Western psychologists have assimilated the Buddhist
practices and ideas, the mainstream definition of mindfulness has departed from Langer’s
conceptualization in several ways (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Bishop, et al., 2004). Current
conceptualizations more explicitly include awareness of the individual’s own internal
world (i.e. body, feelings, and thoughts), whereas Langer focused more on the external
world. Langer emphasizes creative information processing and inductive reasoning;
however, more recent conceptualizations of mindfulness state that it explicitly involves
the inhibition of “secondary elaborative processing of thoughts, feelings, and sensations
arising in the stream of consciousness” (Bishop. et al., 2004, p. 233).
Chang, et al. (2004) state that mindfulness is currently commonly defined within
psychology according to Brown and Ryan’s (2003) definition as, “the state of being
attentive to and aware of what is taking place at the present moment.” This definition is
clear and succinct yet incomplete because it leaves out an essential aspect of the
construct: an accepting attitude of non-judgment and non-reactance toward experience.
Safran and Muran (2000) explicitly acknowledge the value of this attitude. They state,
“The component of nonjudgmental awareness plays a critical role in helping people to
observe whatever emerges without pushing it out of awareness and without losing the
stance of mindfulness, by getting caught up in an infinite spiral of self-judgment” (p. 58).
10

Accordingly, this study will utilize Bishop, et al.’s (2004) two-component model of
mindfulness because it explicitly incorporates the attitude of acceptance within the
definition. They propose that mindfulness is a mode1 of experience characterized by (1.)
purposeful attention to immediate experience of the present moment including sensations,
thoughts, and feelings (2.) and complete acceptance of that experience without “overidentifying with them and reacting to them in an automatic, habitual pattern of reactivity”
(p. 232).
Two States of Mindlessness: Oblivious and Reactive
The two component model of mindfulness implies that mindlessness could result
from a lack of either component. A lack of the first component, awareness, would result
in an oblivious type of mindlessness that is superficially emotionally stable but quite
unconscious of many aspects of experience, particularly that are emotionally challenging.
Oblivious mindlessness is based upon the maintenance of emotional stability by avoiding
uncomfortable aspects of experience. Oblivious mindlessness can also be maintained by
distortion of experience such that it is no longer challenging. We would expect oblivious
mindlessness to be associated with encoding simpler, less contradictory autobiographical
memories. The resultant autobiographical memory will thus have fewer complications,
contradictions, and overall complexity. Some types of experiences will be more likely to
be ignored or dismissed than others, specifically those experiences that are associated
with negative affective states like depression, anxiety, guilt, and shame. Therefore the

1

Mindfulness is regularly described as something in between a state and trait. For example,
Brown and Ryan describe it as a state of consciousness that varies both within and between individuals,
Sternberg (2000) as a cognitive style, Bishop, et al. (2004) as a mode of experience.
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autobiographical narratives associated with oblivious mindlessness are predicted to be
generally less complex and specifically to contain less articulation of emotional
experience.
Quite differently, another type of mindlessness results from a lack of the second
component of mindfulness, the ability to accept experience without reacting to it and then
to let it go. Without this ability, recognition of uncomfortable of aspects experience can
lead to both intensified emotional reaction and ruminative cognitive activity.
An attitude of acceptance changes the semantic context of the experience of
negative emotions. Acceptance can reduce the intensity of the emotional reaction by
making it feel more subjectively tolerable, as opposed to urgent and entrapping, and by
reducing secondary emotional reactions, like fear, to the initial negative emotion. An
attitude of acceptance also implies not holding onto or identifying with the experience.
Thus mindfulness is associated with non-identification with thoughts and feelings, which
means that one’s current experience is perceived as simply a temporally limited state as,
opposed to a defining feature of the self or of existence. Thus an experience of dysphoria
will be registered as local and impersonal (e.g. “at this moment I am experiencing a bad
mood”) as opposed to personal and global (e.g. “I am depressed as always because that is
my curse in life.”) Basically non-identification reduces the subjective intensity of
emotional experience by decreasing the threat to self and future.
Acceptance can also lead to reduced rumination, a form of self focused cognitive
processing that is associated with neuroticism (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). When an
experience contains a negative affective component, and the mind responds to that affect
with further affectively charged thought, compulsive rumination often ensues. Teasdale,
12

Segal, Williams, and Mark (1995) contrast this mindless state, in which attention is mired
in ruminative thought processes about a mental event, its historical antecedents, and
future implications, with mindfulness, in which a direct experience of the mental event is
followed by freely letting that experience go and making room for another. Teasdale and
Bernard (1993) assert that rumination can actually intensify the negative affective state
that triggered it. Teasdale, Segal and Williams (1994) describe self-sustaining cognitive
and sensory loops triggered by activation of emotionally charged core schemas (e.g.
hopelessness about self and future) which then lead to sensory experiences and cognitive
attributions that further reinforce the schema (e.g. somatic feelings of fatigue and
appraisal of social interactions as failures) leading to an “interlock configuration” ,
basically a self sustaining negative feedback loop. Mindfulness breaks the cycle of
rumination through inhibition of the secondary evaluative processing of experience that
further strengthens the core schema and affective state. Teasdale, et al., (2000) theorize
that reduction in ruminative thought is one of the key mechanisms by which mindfulness
meditation leads to reduced depression. Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, and McQuaid (2004)
provide preliminary support for this claim by demonstrating that reductions in ruminative
thought, subsequent to completion of an eight week MBSR intervention, remain
significant after controlling for changes in affective symptoms and dysfunctional beliefs.
However, rumination, in turn, precludes mindfulness by fostering ongoing emotional
reaction and myopic focus on a single mood congruent topic, which precludes a return of
awareness to the experience of the present moment.
In summary, a lack of acceptance can lead to intensified negative emotional
experience and a subsequent ruminative cycle. The intensified negative feelings, like
13

depression and anxiety, will in turn lead to biases in attention, reduced cognitive
resources, and reduced encoding of experience into memory. Anxiety has been shown to
lead to disproportionate attention to threatening stimuli (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton,
2001). Likewise, depression leads to selective attention for negatively valenced stimuli
(Mineka & Nugent, 1995). Anxiety elicits task-irrelevant cognitive activity, like
worrying, that consumes psychological resources in working memory (Baddeley, 1986).
Depression has also been widely associated with reduced speed of automotive cognitive
processing (e.g. den Hartog, Derix, van Bemmel, Kremer, & Jolles, 2003). Finally in a
recent review of the effects of anxiety on memory, Macleod and Mathews (2004) provide
compelling evidence that anxiety impedes performance on a number of cognitive tasks,
especially memory tasks and is associated with memory deficits. Research on the effects
of depression and anxiety demonstrate the manner that affective arousal can lead to
biased, selective attention and reduced cognitive resources both of which will impede
mindfulness.
It is important to distinguish these two differing states of mindlessness because
they will lead to very different impairments of autobiographical narrative, which will be
clarified after examination of the relevant literature on autobiographical narrative and
memory.
Functions of Autobiographical Narrative
Beyond providing further understanding into mindfulness itself, the relationship
between mindfulness and autobiographical narrative is also of interest because
autobiographical narrative predicts a wide variety of fundamental psychological
functions. Bluck, Alea, Habermas, and Rubin (2005) recently reviewed literature on the
14

function of autobiographical memory, which they define very similarly to
autobiographical narrative, and suggested three overarching functions: directive, self, and
social. They empirically tested and confirmed their model, with the exception of the
social function, which actually appeared to be composed of two factors. They describe
the directive function as “using the past to guide present and future behavior” (p. 93).
Much of the theory on the function of autobiographical narrative falls into the directive
category. By condensing myriad individual experiences into prototypical patterns,
narratives provide a map or template that provides cognitive organization and
interpretation of the environment, explanation of the past, and prediction of the future. As
Russell & van de Broek (1992) explain, “Narrative schemas provide means to recognize,
organize, remember, and anticipate experience; they structure the world in which
behavioral choices arise” (p. 347).
Both attachment theorists and social learning theorists predict that
autobiographical narrative profoundly affects social relationships and general well being.
According to attachment theory, early attachment experiences serve as a primary, central
narrative or internal working model through which all other later relationships are viewed
(Bowlby, 1982). This template often works as a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating
expectations and interpersonal patterns that recreate the original attachment relationship
in other important later relationships. In contrast social learning theorists focus on the
narrative representations of the recent past and present, examining how these narratives
reflect underlying social contingency patterns. Wahler and Castlebury (2002) state,
“Present day experiences acquire salience when the narrator can trace their historical
roots to highlight the contingency patterns that account for these experiences” (p. 301).
15

Autobiographical narratives that incorporate more experiences and that adequately
synthesize those experiences create more useful models of contingency patterns. Bruner
(1992) has even suggested that narrative understanding is one of the basic modes of
thought for structuring human experience. He argues that there are two fundamental
ways of constructing reality, logical-scientific and narrative, and that the cultural and
individual influences on narrative style and ability shape the very way that an individual
construes reality, specifically reality within the domain of human interaction.
Bluck, et al.’s (2005) self function of autobiographical memory is primarily
focused on self continuity, specifically the development and maintenance of a
biographical identity and coherent self concept across the lifespan. McAdams (1993)
identity theory of life narrative is a classic example of a self function. He suggests an
essential function of autobiographical narrative is providing meaning and a coherent
center to organize the many disparate roles of a modern life. Conway and Tachi (1996)
even suggest that autobiographical memory is an intrinsic part of the self.
Bluck, et al.’s (2005) final functional category is social, which according to their
factor analysis is actually composed of two complementary social functions: developing
new relationships and maintaining existing relationships. Autobiographical narratives
foster the development of new relationships by fostering cognitive and emotional
intimacy with an other person. Once a relationship has been established, sharing life
stories is a common bonding activity, and actually the most frequently reported function
of sharing autobiographical memories. Reminiscing about shared experiences seems to
be a particularity important aspect of the social maintenance function of autobiographical
memory.
16

Recently many of these theoretical claims about the importance of narrative have
received significant empirical support. A large body of research substantiates attachment
theory’s premise that attachment related narratives strongly relate to quality of
interpersonal relationships. The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) provides a powerful
method of quantifying the coherence of an adult’s attachment related narratives (Main,
1996). The AAI requires adults to provide narratives about attachment related
experiences, which are then classified as coherent or incoherent. A meta-analysis of
studies examining the relationship between AAI status (coherent vs. incoherent) of adults
and their children’s attachment status (secure vs. insecure) as assessed by the strange
situation yielded a very large effect size of 1.06 (van IJzendoorn, 1995), indicating that
parents with coherent narratives were likely to have securely attached children. This
effect size remained equally strong when based solely upon prospective studies, in which
the AAI was given to parents before the birth of their child. Parental responsiveness is a
potential mediating mechanism that partially accounts for the relationship between the
coherence of adults’ attachment related narrative and children’s attachment status. Van
IJzendoorn (1995) found an effect size of .72 for the relationship between AAI status and
parental responsiveness and parents AAI status accounted for 12% of the variation in
responsiveness. Finally, in yet another meta-analysis van IJzendoorn & BakermansKranenburg, (1996) found a modest correlation (.28) between the AAI status of fathers
and mothers, indicating that women with coherent attachment related narratives were
likely to be married to men with similarly coherent narratives. Thus in sum, the research
on the AAI indicates that better quality attachment related narratives are associated with
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responsive parenting, a greater likelihood of marrying a spouse with a similarly coherent
attachment narrative, and a greater likelihood of raising a securely attached child.
Studies independent of AAI methodology also find a relationship between
narrative quality and interpersonal relationships. For example, Shields, Ryan, and
Cicchetti, (2001) found that maltreated children had less coherent narrative
representations of their parents than well treated children. Coherent narrative
representation was related to peer preference and prosocial behavior and negatively
related to aggression and peer rejection. Narrative coherence mediated the effect of
maltreatment on peer rejection in part by mitigating emotional regulation problems. This
study indicates that emotion regulation is one of the important functions of
autobiographical narrative.
In addition to the associations with enhanced interpersonal relationships, better
quality narratives are also associated with greater well being. Oppenheim, Nir, Warren,
and Emde (1997) found that children with more coherent narratives were more likely to
be rated by their mothers as having fewer behavior problems and better emotional
regulation than children with poor narratives. In another meta-analysis of studies of the
relationship between AAI status and various psychological disorders, van IJzendoorn and
Bakermans-Kranenburg, (1996) found a strong relationship (d=1.03) between the quality
of the adult attachment narrative and clinical status. Baerger and McAdams (1999) found
positive correlations between narrative coherence and both happiness and life satisfaction
and a negative correlation with depression in adults. Expanding the relationship between
narrative and well-being, Pennebaker and Seagal (1999) found a positive correlation
between use of cognitive words in narrative and physical health.
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Analyzing Narrative: Dimensions of Individual Difference
Frequent states of mindfulness could have a number of complex effects on the
encoding of autobiographical memory, the internal structuring of those memories into a
life schema, and the process of expressing that schema in narrative form to another
person. The only way to clarify the relationship between mindfulness and narrative is to
empirically observe. Unfortunately we are not aware of an existing measure of
autobiographical narrative explicitly developed for sensitivity to the effects of
mindfulness. Thus it will be necessary to understand the different ways that
autobiographical narrative has been analyzed, described, and measured, in order to
identify those relevant to mindfulness. Narrative has been a theoretical and empirical
subject of study in a number of academic traditions including literary criticism,
anthropology, sociology, and psychology (Cortazzi, 1993). Considering the great
quantity of literature that has been devoted to understanding and analyzing narrative, any
global overview of narrative theory will be insufficient. Nevertheless, this study will
focus on the study of narrative within psychology and will utilize organizational
dimensions provided by Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber (1998), who suggest that
systems of narrative analysis can be categorized according to two dimensions: holistic
versus categorical systems and content versus formal systems.
The holistic-categorical dimension refers to the unit of analysis. Holistic
analytical systems examine narratives as a whole, while categorical systems break
narratives into smaller units, typically clauses (Labov, & Waletsky, 1967; Foa, Molnar, &
Cashman, 1995) or units of complete thought (Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, &
Orwoll, 1995). Holistic coding systems typically quantify the relative presence or
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absence of some quality like coherence (Baerger & McAdams, 1999), integration (Segal,
Wood, DeMeis, & Smith, 2003), or linguistic complexity (Gray & Lombardo, 2001). In
contrast categorical systems label each clause or thought unit according to a
predetermined number of mutually exclusive categories. For example Foa, et al. (1995)
categorized each clause according to a number of descriptive categories like organized
thought, disorganized thought, supporting detail, and repetition. Narratives are then
analyzed according to relative proportion of different types of clause or thought units.
Analyses at the categorical level tend to be highly reliable but are extremely time
intensive for longer narratives and can miss the greater context that allows for subtler
understanding of the meaning of a given clauses. As will be explained later, our study is
focused on longer, more extensive narratives and, therefore, it is much more feasible to
code at the holistic level. Relevant categorical level coding systems will be reviewed but
will require adaptation to a holistic level of analysis for utilization in this study.
The content-formal dimension refers to the focus of analysis. Content focused
systems concentrate on what is communicated while formal systems focus on how it is
communicated. Content based analyses involve the documentation of the presence or
absence of specific themes within the narrative. Examples include justice (Pratt &
Arnold, 1995), resolution of conflict (Segal, Wood, DeMeis, & Smith, 2002), defensive
processes (Androutsopoulo, Thanopolou, Econmou, & Bafiti, 2004), and specific plot
type (Thorne & McLean, 2003). Formal systems examine the manner in which the
narrative is told. Formal analysis has tended to focus primarily on narrative complexity
and narrative coherence. Examples of analyses of complexity include multiplicity
(Goncalves, Henriques, Alves, & Soares, 2002), complexity of self representation
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(Labouvie-Vief, et al., 1995), cognitive/linguistic complexity (Russell & van den Brock,
1992), psychological complexity (Segal, et al., 2002), and life role complexity (Segal, et
al., 2002). It is important to note, however, that content versus form is a spectrum and
thus some constructs (e.g. complexity of self representation, Labouvie-Vief, et al., 1995;
psychological complexity, Segal, et al., 2002) fall in the middle and are actually mergers
of form and content, as they entail an increasingly complex form that also contain
increasing amounts of specific types of content.
Much of the narrative research within psychology has focused solely on narrative
coherence, a type of formal analysis. In order to effectively convey a life story in a way
that is understandable, believable, and engaging, a narrative must cohere to certain story
telling principles, known collectively as coherence. As Mandler (1984) explains, “stories
have an underlying, or base, structure that remains relatively invariant in spite of gross
difference in content from story to story” (p. 22). Coherence has been theorized to
contain a great diversity of sub-factors. Adapting psycholinguistic research on text
comprehension to their review of the various components of narrative coherence,
Habermas and Bluck (2000) argue that overall coherence can be fully accounted for by
four sub-factors: temporal, biographical, causal, and thematic coherence. They
suggested that individual events in a narrative must be connected chronologically and by
cause and effect, thus creating temporal and causal coherence. A narrative has
biographical coherence when it contains the essential components of a life story (e.g.
leaving home, first job, important romantic relationships, etc.). Thematic coherence
involves establishing thematic similarities between the various elements of a life and
acknowledging some sense of meaning or purpose in life. They suggest that temporal
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and biographical coherence are fundamental necessities of narrative, providing the basic
skeleton of a narrative and allowing for comprehensibility. These are the fundamental
aspects of coherence that make a narrative a narrative. Not surprisingly, these two
aspects of coherence are heavily featured in coding systems meant to asses the coherence
of people with debilitating psychological disorders, like schizophrenia (Lysacker,
Clements, Plascak-Hallberg, Knipscheer, & Wright, 2002) and Alzheimer’s disease
(Usita, Hyman, & Herman, 1998). Habermas and Bluck state that causal and thematic
coherence “express the unique interpretative stance of the individual” (p. 750). These are
the more sophisticated aspects of coherence that distinguish between better and worse
narratives. Accordingly this study will focus on these latter two aspects of coherence,
which Habermas and Bluck describe as most important in establishing the overall global
coherence of the life story.
Further examination of the different dimensions of analysis suggest expanding
Lieblich, et al.’s (1998) two-dimension system to include a third dimension: narrative
quality versus interpersonal behavior. All of the coding systems reviewed so far have
focused on the qualities of the narrative but some theorists have suggested examining the
relational behavior of the narrator with the listener or co-narrator. Strickland (1994)
recommended examining the difference between the voice of the protagonist of the
narrative and the narrator of the story. He specifically advocated an examination of the
characteristics of the narrator in the context of their relationship to the interviewer (e.g.
soliciting help, challenging, etc.). Androutsopoulo, et al., (2004) suggest examining
“acknowledging/ responding to the needs of the audience.” Fiese and Spagnola (2005)
review a number of coding systems that quantify the relative ability of a family or couple
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to cooperate and support each other in the construction of a narrative. The Adult
Attachment Interview (Main, 1996) includes an assessment of collaborative behaviors on
the part of the narrator, like recognizing and excusing slips in coherence (i.e. licensing)
and collaborative discourse in which the narrator inquires about the interests of the
interviewer and tailors the narrative to them. However, because our interviewers will
follow a carefully structured script in order to reduce interviewer based variance, the
interviewers have little opportunity to freely interact with the narrators. This will greatly
reduce variance in interpersonal behavior; hence, this dimension will be excluded from
the current study.
Hypothetical Qualities of a Mindful Narrative
Applying to narrative the idea that mindlessness can result from defensive
avoidance of experience or emotional rumination about experience, several theoretical
predictions become apparent. Oblivious mindlessness theoretically involves ignoring or
distorting entire categories of experience, thus leading to the development of overly
simplified autobiographical knowledge. We predict that the resulting autobiographical
narrative would be less complex, specifically with regards to description of emotional
experience. Accordingly general methods of coding narrative complexity and specific
methods of coding emotional articulacy will be reviewed. In contrast reactive
mindlessness involves the inability to let go of emotionally challenging mental events.
Reactive mindlessness implies that once such a mental event is experienced, a negative
feedback loop can ensue, in which ruminative thought and negative affect mutually
strengthen each other. This in turn leads to emotional destabilization and impairment of
cognitive abilities. We expect this to impact the story telling behavior itself. Story
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telling is a complex and cognitively challenging task, which when successful leads to
coherence. Therefore we predict that reactive mindlessness will be associated with
impaired coherence scores subsequent to contemplating an emotionally challenging life
event.
Mindfulness and narrative complexity.
The open-minded, nonjudgmental attitude with which experience is mindfully
approached entails a purposeful setting aside of preconceived notion or schemas as one
encounters new material. In traditional Buddhist writing this has been described as
“Beginner’s Mind” and entails the purposeful engagement in each action or experience as
if it was occurring for the first time. This aspect of mindfulness concords quite well with
Langer’s (1989) original definition of mindfulness as openness to new information and
creation of new categories. In contrast to “beginner’s mind”, approaching new
information with a specific schema in mind is likely to lead to either a failure to encode
schema discordant information or a biased encoding of that information so that it
concords with prior schemas. In the words of a Tibetan Lama, Chogyam Trungpa
(1991), “The clarity of our consciousness is veiled by prefabricated concepts and
whatever we see we try to fit into some pigeonhole or in some way make it fit in with our
preconceived ideas” (p. 103). Cognitive research on the effects of schemas on
information processing support these ideas. Schematic processing has been shown to be
associated both with distortions (Bartlett, 1932; Duncan, 1976) and reduced perceptual
encoding (von Hippel, Jonides, Hilton, & Narayan, 1993).
Returning to the two types of mindlessness, it is specifically oblivious
mindfulness that would seem likely to impair the development of complex
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autobiographical narrative. Oblivious mindlessness explicitly entails schematic
processing, as certain beliefs and assumptions about the world are both constantly used to
interpret and understand experience and rigidly defended from new schema-discordant
information. The long term effects of continual schematic information processing, as
opposed to the more unbiased processing involved with mindfulness, will be that simple
schemas rarely need to be accommodated to new information and thus fail to develop
more complexity. Consequently the narratives of mindful participants are expected to
contain more complex schemas and resulting narrative plots, more limiting caveats on
generalizations and theories, and more complex descriptions of self and others. They are
also more likely to express recognition of the subjectivity of the narrator’s perspective
and to include other perspectives.
Quantifying complexity.
Several different aspects of narrative complexity have been quantitatively
analyzed including multiplicity, linguistic complexity, and psychological complexity.
Goncalves, et al.’s (2002) narrative multiplicity evaluation method provides a way to
quantify general narrative complexity. They recommend counting the number of themes,
events, settings, and characters. Narratives with a greater number of each of these
elements are described as having greater multiplicity and thus reflecting greater
differentiation of experience. Similarly, Russell & van de Broek (1992) recommend
assessing relative degree of narrative elaboration by assessing the number of plots a
narrative contains. We would expect more mindful narratives to demonstrate greater
narrative multiplicity; however, multiplicity seems to be an inadequate operationalization
of narrative complexity because it does not explicitly differentiate between multiplicity
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arising from incoherence and inclusion of irrelevant material, and multiplicity arising
from complexity of thinking and storytelling.
Russell & van de Broek (1992) also propose that a core quality of
autobiographical narrative is “linguistic complexity” which they recommend assessing
through calculating a ratio based upon the average number of clauses per main clause. In
a later article they utilize a slightly different operationalization of linguistic complexity,
based upon counting the average number of words per segment, which they define as an
independent clause and its accompanying dependent clauses (Russell, van de Broek,
Rosenberger, & Essig 1993). Similarly Gray and Lombardo (2001) assessed linguistic
complexity through total narrative word count and the computerized Flesch Reading Ease
Index but found that both of these measures are highly confounded with linguistic skill
and general cognitive ability. Because mindfulness theoretically should impact the
complexity of content, as opposed to the specific verbal expression of that content, and
because linguistic complexity is often confounded with general cognitive ability, this
study will not rely on measures of linguistic complexity.
The aspect of narrative complexity to receive the greatest empirical attention
within psychological literature, not surprisingly, is psychological complexity, which has
been quantified in a number of differing ways. Segal, et al. (2002) provide two narrative
coding indices designed to analyze autobiographical narratives provided as imaginary
descriptions of one’s own future. “Psychological Complexity” assesses the degree to
which the subject understands him or herself and others, including tolerance of both
negative and positive qualities, and the acknowledgement that self-awareness and
psychological functioning improve over time. “Life Role Complexity” assesses the
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degree to which the subject understands that any given developmental stage requires
multiples social roles, and that adjustment to these roles will take time and effort to find a
compromise between the demands of self and others. We would expect mindfulness to
correlate with both of these indexes; however, due to practical limitations this study will
focus on a single measure of complexity, and neither of these indices taps the aspect of
narrative complexity most theoretically relevant to mindfulness.
The complexity of representation of self and others seems especially likely to be
sensitive to the effects of mindfulness. People are the principle subjects of narratives,
and as such are often described with more detail and complexity than other narrative
topics. Some of the most emotionally threatening information is data about the self or
important others. For example people tend to selectively attend to self enhancing
autobiographical memories (Walker, et al., 2003). Furthermore, as psychology well
knows, descriptions of self and others are much more subjective than many phenomena,
making it easy to ignore or distort such information. Thus, information regarding self
and others seems particularly vulnerable to dismissal or distortion in a state of oblivious
mindlessness. Representations of people are also of interest because they are directly
related to one of the core functions of narrative, providing understanding of self and
others.
Labouvie-Vief, et al. (1995) propose a system of coding complexity of self
representations based on research examining dialectical thinking and wisdom related
cognitions. The system is based upon a developmental model whereby representations of
self that are based on individuality, context, and process are coded as more complex than
representations revealing fusion of the self with others or with social conventions. Their
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system is especially relevant to the study of mindfulness and narrative considering that
Bishop, et al. (2003) specifically predicted scores on it would co-vary with mindfulness.
They base this claim on the assumption that because mindfulness practice leads to
increased understanding of the subjectivity and limitations of one’s own cognitive
processes, mindfulness should be associated with “complexity of cognitive
representations in self narratives” (p. 234). Unfortunately, however, the Labouvie-Vief, et
al. (1995) system is not suited to the specific methodological demands of this study. It is
a categorical as opposed to a global system, and requires categorization of each unit of
complete thought (typically a sentence) according to its complexity of self representation.
Although pragmatic when applied to the relatively short self descriptions utilized in the
validation study, the coding system will be extremely time demanding when applied to
longer narratives. When the authors attempted to adapt their coding system to the holistic
level, they found the resulting system had no “single criterion by which overall scores are
assigned making such assignment quite intuitive” (p. 407), and hence lead to difficultly
establishing inter-rater reliability.
Accordingly this study will rely on a related yet more feasible system. Leigh,
Westen, Barends, Mendel, and Byer (1992) designed a coding system for the assessment
of the complexity of representations of people in oral narratives. Low scores on the scale
reflect an inability to clearly differentiate self from others or to describe people in
concrete and undifferentiated terms. High scores reflect a portrayal of self and others as
having stable and yet multi-dimensional dispositions and as psychological beings with
complex motives and subjective experience. Unlike Labouvie-Vief, et al.’s (1995)
system, the measure is global in scope and will fit the needs of the study quite well.
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Mindfulness and emotional articulacy.
Systematic avoidance of emotionally challenging mental events (e.g. perceptual,
cognitive, or emotional experience) will have profound effects on the autobiographical
narrative as whole categories of experience are systematically ignored and thus never
synthesized into the narrative. One particular vulnerability of such narratives is a lack of
information about emotional experience, particularly the experience of negative affect.
This avoidance impacts autobiographical narrative in a number of ways. First of all, an
oblivious narrator is likely to select less emotionally intense topics to talk about. When
he or she does talk about a difficult life experience, he is likely to provide a less articulate
and detailed description of his or her emotional reaction, or to even include any
emotional reaction to that event whatsoever. In contrast, a mindful person should
theoretically have a wider array of detailed emotional experiences within their
autobiographical memories. Thus, Bishop, et al. (2004) theorized that mindfulness entails
the, “ability to generate differentiated and integrated representations of … affective
experience” (p. 234). Accordingly we would expect a relatively mindful person’s
narrative to not only include articulate descriptions of emotional experience, but also to
include certain descriptive content about emotions that result from the systematic
observation of emotions, such as ambivalence.
Establishing the relationship between mindfulness and emotional articulacy will
be more difficult because of the expected effect of reactive mindlessness. In contrast to
oblivious mindlessness, reactive mindlessness entails a hyper-focus on emotional
experience and secondary elaborative processing of that experience. Such processing
could ultimately lead to very complex and articulate descriptions of and theories about
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emotional experience (e.g. metaphorical description, theories about the meaning of
emotion, and theories about multiple secondary causes of emotion). Thus it is possible
that mindful narrators may evidence greater emotional articulacy than oblivious narrators
but less articulacy than reactive narrators, assuming a measure of emotional articulacy
includes complex descriptions of and concepts about emotion. Thus our study will
require a measure of emotional articulacy able to differentiate these types of emotional
description.
Quantifying emotional articulation.
Although a number of coding systems have items relevant to quantitative analysis
of emotional articulacy, no system fully operationalizes the construct. Baerger and
McAdam’s (1999) affect index is less relevant than name would indicate. The index
assesses the degree to which the narrator includes the current emotional significance of
the historical experience described in the narrative. Basically it is an assessment of the
skillful use of emotion to express the present day significance of the past episode by
creating an affective tone or signifying emotional meaning2. It is not explicitly concerned
with the articulacy or complexity of the narrator’s description of his emotional experience
in the past.
Goncalves, Henriques, Alves, and Rocha (2001) provide an index of the degree of
emotional subjectification. Their index gives low scores to undifferentiated affective
experience and higher scores to multiple differentiated emotional experiences.
Unfortunately their coding manual does not provide specific instructions in further
differentiation of low and high scores. While their index points to the importance of both
2

It thus is related to Labov’s (1972) evaluation, or why the story is being told.
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differentiation and ambivalence, it does not have specific enough description of the
multiple levels of emotional articulacy to be reliably used in this study.
Androutsopoulo, et al. (2004) compared the therapy transcripts of patients
beginning therapy with the narratives of patients who graduated from therapy. One of
their distinguishing criteria, “being in touch with emotions” is quite relevant to the
construct of emotional articulacy. The authors describe it as providing a story that feels
warm without feeling melodramatic and reveals the ability to acknowledge emotion with
out simply ventilating or ignoring it. Despite the relevance of their theoretical
description, their method is qualitative. Quantitative use of their item would require
significant interpretation and inference to operationalize their intuitively based
descriptions3.
Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, and Zeitlan’s (1990) Levels of Emotional
Awareness Scale is the most relevant existing scale. It is based upon a cognitivedevelopmental model of emotional experience. It poses twenty evocative interpersonal
situations and asks the participants for hypothetical emotional responses of self and other.
Low scores on the scale reflect a description of emotion as thought or as simple
physiological response. Middle scores reflect increasing use of emotion specific
language. High score reflect descriptions of ambivalence. The highest possible score
requires the description of distinct emotional states in self and other. The developmental
model behind this scale has much to offer our study, but the specific methodology of this

3

They expand on this construct by providing a detailed description of two categories of defensive
processes that lead one to be out of touch with emotions: avoiding emotions and regulating emotions.
These behaviors are a result of difficultly tolerating affect and hence are hypothesized to be negatively
correlated with mindfulness. Due to pragmatic limitations, however, this hypothesis will not be tested in
the current study.
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scale has several drawbacks. It requires specifically asking for the participants’
emotional response, whereas the present study will inquire about emotionally evocative
experiences and leave the participant free to include or exclude their own emotional
reaction. Thus the lowest scores on the scale would not be relevant to the narratives
collected in this study. The highest score, distinct emotional states of self and other, will
be highly correlated with measures of complexity of representation of self and other, thus
confounding two key variables of the study. The most relevant aspects of the scale are
the three midpoints: undifferentiated emotional description, differentiated emotional
description, and ambivalence (i.e. the experience of two or more distinct emotions at the
same time).
Because none of the existing measures of emotional articulacy satisfactorily
address the aspects of emotional articulacy most theoretically related to mindfulness,
adequate quantification of emotional articulacy will require the development of a new
measure. Such a measure will need to distinguish between a complete lack of emotional
experiences, undifferentiated descriptions, distinct descriptions, elaborated or complex
descriptions, and ambivalence. Furthermore, in order to avoid making assumptions about
the relations of these different forms of description with each other (e.g. one is superior to
another, or that high frequency in one implies low frequency of another), an ideal coding
system will independently assess the narratives in the separate categories of emotional
description.
Mindfulness and coherence.
Not all mindless states are a result of defensive avoidance of experience. As
discussed above mindlessness can also result from secondary emotional reaction and
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evaluative processing of experience. When an experience contains a negative affective
component, a mindful attitude of acceptance leads to a lessened sense of distress, less
secondary emotional reaction, and decreased chance of a subsequent ruminative cycle. A
mindless approach to the experience intensifies emotions like depression and anxiety is
likely to lead to biased, selective attention, impaired cognitive capacities, and decreased
encoding of experience into memory.
Telling a coherent narrative is a challenging task requiring temporally and
causally connecting autobiographical memories according to a recognizable story
structure that conveys some sense of significance or meaning about the narrator’s life as a
whole. The narration of an emotionally disturbing event typically leads to reexperiencing a substantial proportion of the negative affect of the original experience
(Pasupathi, 2003). If a narrator experiences intense states of negative emotional arousal,
their ability to tell a coherent story will often be compromised. However, a more mindful
narrator should theoretically experience less subjective distress and thus their ability to
coherently tell a story should be less impaired. Thus we predict mindfulness will be
associated with greater narrative coherence when narrating stories about emotionally
disturbing life events.
Quantifying coherence.
As discussed above, this study will focus on causal and thematic coherence
because these are two of the most challenging forms of narrative coherence to achieve
and hence the most likely to be sensitive to affective interference (Habermas & Bluck,
2000). Accordingly, we searched for adequate operationalizations of thematic and causal
coherence amongst the existing literature (Labov & Waletsky, 1967, Stein & Glenn,
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1979; Peterson & McCabe, 1983; Strickland, 1994: Main, 1996; Segal, et al., 2003;
Thorne & McLean, 2003). We ultimately selected Baerger and McAdams’ (1999) Life
Story Coherence measure as it allowed for assessing both thematic and causal coherence
using a single authors’ measure. The life Story Coherence measure is composed of four
subscales. Due the high number of variables coders were required to assess, the present
study utilized only the two subscales deemed most relevant to thematic and causal
coherence.
The first of the subscales used was the Structural Coherence Index (Baerger &
McAdams, 1999), chosen to tap the construct of causal coherence. Establishing causal
coherence entails illustrating the causal connection between the individual events in a
narrative. The index assesses the extent that a given narrative includes all of the events
of a good story or “episode system (Stein & Glenn, 1979)” and the extent to which these
events are temporally and causally connected.
Thematic coherence is created by establishing thematic similarity between various
elements of a life. Baerger and McAdams’ (1999) Integrative Coherence measure
assesses thematic coherence by measuring the extent to which the narrator “expresses the
meaning of the experiences described within the context of the larger life story (p. 81). ”
Unfortunately, it also appears to assess a related but separate construct involving
integration of the various parts of the narrative into a coherent whole; the authors specify
that high scores on this index also entail that “discrepancies, contradiction, and
inconsistencies are eventually resolved, and the various narrative elements are
synthesized. (p.81)” We interpreted this to mean the Integrative Coherence index
involves two constructs: integration of various narrative components into a unified
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narrative, a concept we deemed “cohesion,” and integration of the main narrative event
into the narrator’s life story as a whole, a concept we deemed “evaluation.” In order to
avoid the ambiguity associated with condensing two or more constructs into a single
scale, we chose to split integration into two subcomponents: Cohesion and Evaluation.
In summary, this study operationalized coherence with three scales, Structure,
Evaluation, and Cohesion, all of which were based upon Baerger and McAdams (1999)
Integrative and Structural Coherence Indices. As the present study is focused on
coherence in general as opposed to components or subfactors of coherence, the three
scales will be aggregated for a total Coherence score.
Attachment Style and Mindfulness
Lacking primary measures of oblivious and reactive mindlessness, this study will
indirectly assess these constructs by examining the interaction between attachment style
and mindfulness. The avoidant attachment style is conceptually related to an oblivious
style of mindlessness in that both involve a defensive denial of certain aspects of
experience, particularly those aspects that evoke feelings of vulnerability or emotional
distress. Recently Tacón (2006) has reviewed literature linking avoidant attachment style
with mindlessness through the common use of repression and denial. Avoidant
individuals demonstrate significantly higher levels of psychological defensiveness,
significantly less accessibility to memories associated with negative emotions, and
significantly less intensity of experience of negative emotions than any other attachment
group (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). Participants reporting both low levels of
mindfulness and an avoidant attachment style should theoretically exemplify oblivious
mindlessness.
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The preoccupied adult attachment style is similar to the reactive style of
mindlessness in that both involve a hyper-focus on emotionally distressing experiences
and a subsequent affective destabilization. For example, preoccupied individuals
demonstrate low levels of psychological defensiveness, high accessibility to negatively
emotionally charged emotions, high intensity of negative emotions, and a tendency for
experience of one negative emotion to activate other negative emotions (Mikulincer &
Orbach, 1995). Preoccupied participants reporting low levels of mindfulness should
theoretically exemplify reactive mindlessness.
Objective of the Study
Mindfulness based interventions are an increasingly popular form of treatment for
a diversity of physical and psychological disorders, and yet little is known about
mindfulness itself, the construct at the heart of these interventions. Williams, et al.
(2000) presented evidence that mindfulness is associated with increased specificity of
autobiographical memory. In order to provide greater conceptual clarity about
mindfulness, this study aims to further explore the relationship between mindfulness and
other aspects of autobiographical memory, specifically qualities of autobiographical
narrative.
Integrating Bishop, et al.’s (2003) two component model of mindfulness with
empirical findings about rumination and information processing, we propose that there
are two differing states of mindlessness: oblivious mindlessness and reactive
mindlessness, which we predict will have differing effects on autobiographical narrative.
Because mindfulness theoretically precludes defensive avoidance of affective experience
and schematic information processing, we predict that it will be associated with (1)
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complexity of representations of people and (2) narrative measures of emotional
articulacy. These effects are predicted to be most evident in people with an avoidant style
of mindlessness.
Considering its proven effects on stress and affect regulation, mindfulness is also
predicted to lead to decreased subjective distress and rumination when discussing
emotionally challenging life events. Providing a coherent narrative is a cognitively
challenging activity with which emotional dysregulation will likely interfere. Therefore,
we hypothesize that (3) mindfulness will predict increased narrative coherence of
negatively valenced life events in comparison to the coherence of positive life events.
This effect will likely be most evident for those with a preoccupied style of mindlessness.
Additionally, a number of measures related to both psychopathology and verbal
ability will be included to assess the validity of the mindfulness and narrative measures.
The existing literature (e.g. Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) contains
both proven and theorized relationships with these measures. Replication of these
relationships will affirm the construct validity of the mindfulness and narrative measures.
Specifically we aim to replicate negative relationships between mindfulness and
depression, alexithymia, and brooding. Also given that Emotional Articulacy is a new
scale, these other measures will help clarify its meaning. We expected it to predict verbal
ability and reflection and to negatively predict alexithymia.
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Chapter II
Method
Participants
This study utilized participants drawn from a subject pool of undergraduate
students enrolled in psychology classes at a large Southeastern public university.
Participants will were recruited through announcements posted on their class website and
signed up for the project through a research website. They received two hours of extra
credit for their time.
Procedure
Participants were greeted and introduced to the study by a research assistant.
They then completed the informed consent and a short paper and pencil measure (the
RQ). In a separate room will they completed all other self report measures using a
computerized graphical interface for SPSS. Research assistants then administered a
standardized interview to collect autobiographical narratives. Finally participants
completed the vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third
Edition. After this, the research assistant debriefed participants about the purpose and
hypotheses of the study and provided an opportunity for participants to ask questions.
Research assistants were trained in a standardized interview (See appendix A)
adapted from McAdam’s (1996) Life Story Interview and Leigh, et al.’s (1992).
interview procedure. The interview consisted of 6 questions or chapters. In order to
reduce interviewer-based variance, the assistants were trained to make standardized
introductory conversation, ask the same questions, and provide the same responses to
participants’ narratives. Oral narratives were selected over written narratives for two
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reasons. Affective interference with coherent story telling is a crucial variable in the
study. Because writing allows for revision, it is likely to be less susceptible to affective
interference than speaking. Also because speaking requires less effort than writing, oral
interviews typically yield longer and richer narratives than written interviews. The
narratives were taped on a cassette recorder and than transcribed into a written format
using voice recognition software.
Measures
Complexity of Representations of Self and Other.
Leigh, et al.’s (1992) system for coding complexity of representations of people is
based upon object relations theory and social cognition literature. The lowest score on
the scale reflects an inability to clearly differentiate self from others. The next lowest
score reflects description of self and others in concrete and undifferentiated terms.
Middle scores reflect increasingly complex descriptions of both the enduring traits and
the fleeting subjective states of self and other. High scores reflect an ability to integrate
traits with states and use both to understand social behavior. The scale employs a single
seven point scale to assign an over-all complexity value.

The authors obtained strong

inter-rater reliability (above .80). Complexity scores were moderately consistent when
describing different interpersonal episodes (alpha = .69). High complexity scores
predicted a lack of difficulty in intimate relationships. High complexity scores for the
interpersonal difficulty narrative were also associated with comfort with openness with
others and lower social isolation scores.
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Emotional Articulacy Index.
Whenever possible this study utilized existing measures; however, as discussed in the
introduction, in the case of emotional articulacy this was not possible. Instead this study
utilizes a novel index, known as the Emotional Articulacy Index (EAI; see appendix B).
The index simply measures the frequency of the following types of emotional
descriptions: Basic, Distinct, Elaborated, and Ambivalent. All categories except
Elaborated were based upon the developmental model provided by Lane, et al., (1990).
During pilot research, a number of other categories (e.g. metaphor and unconscious
experience) were experimented with and eventually subsumed into the four existing
categories. Basic Emotional Articulacy refers to examples of undifferentiated emotional
language (e.g. “cool” or “bad”), description of the physiological response of emotion
(e.g. “butterflies in my stomach,” or undifferentiated relational language (e.g. “we grew
closer”). Distinct Emotional Articulacy reflects specifying a distinct emotion like joy or
guilt. Ambivalent Emotional Articulacy entails explicit description of simultaneous
experience of two emotions. Elaborated Emotional Articulacy involves providing
thoughts, emotions, or contextual explanation that provides a more specific understanding
of the speaker’s subjective emotional experience. The following is an example of
elaboration upon the emotion of betrayed:
Um, he felt betrayed, he felt, he felt like I was giving up…on what we had. He felt
like, like I was taking the easy way out, that…because I’m dating someone here, he
felt like it was all the distance and that I wasn’t willing to work through the distance
and I wasn’t willing to work through the problems that we had experienced and that,
and that as bad as it was, it would always get better.
By providing separate measure of the frequency of each category, the EAI allows for
a more complex assessment of emotional articulacy than would a single scale measures.
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For example, a given narrative may contain high frequencies of both low level
descriptions (e.g. Basic) and high level descriptions (Ambivalent) which would be
impossible to capture with a single score. Thus each narrator’s emotional articulacy will
be described as a profile of their overall use of different forms of emotional description.
Thus EAI makes no assumptions about the relations of these different forms of emotional
description with each other, but allows these relationship both to vary from individual to
individual and ultimately to be empirically described.
Coherence index.
The present study measured coherence with an aggregate of three scales:
Structure, Evaluation, and Cohesion. These three scales are based upon Baerger and
McAdams (1999) Structural and Integrative Coherence Indices. The authors defined
structure as “displaying the structural element of an episode system (i.e. an initiating
event, an internal responses, an attempts, and a consequence.)” However, during
reliability training several problems occurred in directly adapting this scale. Longer
stories demonstrated multiple episodes, some scoring higher than others on the scale,
presenting a dilemma of whether to arbitrarily measure only one of the episodes or
attempt to average the episodes. When a story contained multiple episodes, raters could
not reliably agree where to divide the narrative into episodes. Raters also had difficulty
reliably identifying some structural elements, particularly attempts and initiating events.
In order to resolve these issues, the present study redefined the structure scale as a story
containing a beginning, middle, and end, all of which are causally connected to each
other (See Appendix C).
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As discussed in the introduction, we divided Baerger and McAdams’ (1999)
Integrative Index into two separate indices: Cohesion and Evaluation (see Appendix C).
The four-point measure of Cohesion quantifies the extent that the individual components
of the narrative hang together as a meaningful whole. Redundancy, lack of a main point,
tangents, and unresolved contradiction will all contribute to lower scores. The threepoint measure of Evaluation assesses the extent that the individual narrative event is
meaningfully related to the rest of the narrator’s life.
Evaluation at lower levels involved comparing a specific life event to other life
events or making a summary statement about the overall quality of the specific life
experience, implying comparison to other life events (e.g. “It was a really hard time in
my life”). At higher levels, it involved defining the meaning of the life event, for
example discussing the lesson learned from the event or the permanent effects of the
event on the narrator.
Hypothesis three is based upon the possibility that affective interference will
impair coherence during the discussion of negatively valenced life events. Thus, the
actual construct of interest in this study is the relative coherence of the positively
valenced narratives in comparison to the negatively valenced narratives. Accordingly,
one variable-- “Difference in Coherence”-- was created.

First different scores for each

of the three types of coherence were calculated by subtracting the Coherence scores of
the negatively valenced chapters from the Coherence scores of the positively valenced
chapters. Thus positive difference scores indicate greater coherence in the positively
valenced chapters and negative difference scores indicated greater coherence in the
negatively valenced chapter. Because the three Coherence indices utilize different Likert
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scales, scores were standardized by dividing the raw difference score of each index of
Coherence by the range of each Likert scale. The three standardized difference scores
were then summed providing a single, standardized summation of “Difference of
Coherence.”
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale.
This study will measure mindfulness with the Mindfulness Attention Awareness
Scale or MAAS (Brown & Ryan 2003). The scale requires respondents to rate according
to a six point likert scale how frequently or infrequently the respondent has each of
fifteen experiences. Each experience describes a different aspect of mindlessness.
Examples include statements such as “I could be experiencing some emotion and not be
conscious of it until some time later,” and “I find myself listening to someone with one
ear, doing something else at the same time.” Higher scores on the MAAS are associated
with reporting less frequent experiences of mindlessness. The MAAS has been
demonstrated to be a reliable measure of mindfulness. Internal consistency ranged from
alpha coefficients of .80 to .87 in different samples and test and retest scores were highly
correlated (r=.81). The MAAS also has strong documented validity. For example, Zen
practitioners, who theoretically should be mindfulness exemplars, had significantly
higher scores on the MAAS than a control group. Furthermore the authors also found
positive correlations between MAAS scores and self report measures of well-being and
self awareness and negative correlations with measures of psychological distress.
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness.
Because the MAAS focuses solely on awareness, as opposed to acceptance, an
additional measure of mindfulness, the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness (KIMS; Baer,
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Smith, & Allen, 2004), will also be included in the study. The KIMS include four subfactors or mindfulness skills. ‘Observing’ refers to the tendency to be aware of a variety
of stimuli in the present moment, including somatic and sensory sensations and emotional
experience. ‘Describing’ involves the capacity to verbally express one’s experience.
‘Acting with Awareness’ is a measure of the tendency to fully engage in one’s current
activity with undivided attention. This construct is theoretically quite similar to
mindfulness as defined in the MAAS and not surprisingly the two scale are strongly
related (r=.57,p <.0001). ‘Accepting/ allowing without judgment’ refers to full
acceptance of the experience in the present without judging or evaluating it. It is quite
related to Bishop, et al.’s (2003) second component of mindfulness and as such is the
most important complement to the MAAS.
The subscales of the KIMS measure are internally consistent. In two separate
samples alpha correlations ranged from .76-.83.

The four sub-factor model fit that

example much better than a one factor model in a confirmatory factor analysis. KIMS
correlations with predicted criterion factors provide evidence of its validity. For
example, high KIMS scores predicted high levels of agreeableness, oneness of
experience, and emotional intelligence, and low levels of neuroticism, alexithymia, and
experiential avoidance.
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Measure (CES-D).
Mindfulness practice leads to decreased depression and decreased subjective
distress (Segal, Teasdale, & Williams, 2004; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Rosenwieg, Reibel,
Greeson, Brainard, & Hojat, 2003). Accordingly, this study will include the CES-D, a
self-report measure of common subclinical symptoms of depression. The scale is
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composed of twenty short descriptions of typical depressive symptoms like, “I did not
feel like eating; my appetite was poor” and “I thought my life had been a failure.”
Participants indicate on a 4-point Likert scale the relative frequency or validity of each
item in regards to the past week. The scale has performed equally (Lubin & Van
Whitlock, 1995) or better (Baker, Velli, Friedman, & Wiley, 1995; Santor Zuroff,
Ramsay, & Cervantes, 1995) to other self report measures of depression like the Beck
Depression Inventory. It was selected for this study because of its subclinical focus,
which will allow for greater variance in a non-clinical population.
Ruminative Response Questionnaire (RRQ).
Reflection is a form of introspection characterized by intellectual self-attention
related to openness to new experience (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Theoretically, it
would seem likely to enhance complexity and emotional articulacy in autobiographical
narratives because it involves observation and analysis of internal reactions. Rumination
or brooding is closely related to reflection but is distinguished by its association with
depression and neuroticism (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Several authors (Ramel,
Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004)
have demonstrated that mindfulness predicts decreased rumination, likely due to
purposeful releasing of attention from the object of rumination and returning attention to
the experience of the present moment.
As such, this study will include measures of both, taken from Treynor, Gonzales,
and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (2003) revision of the Ruminative Response Questionnaire.
They altered the questionnaire to eliminate items that also were descriptive of depression.
They then factor analyzed the resulting items and came up with two five-item factors:
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reflection and brooding. This study will utilize their revised scales as a measure of both
ruminative brooding and of reflection. The authors describe all items in the reflection
factor as neutrally valenced, descriptive of contemplation, and coping focused. Examples
are “Analyze recent events to try to determine why you are depressed” and “Go
someplace alone to think about your feelings.” They describe all of the items in the
brooding facer as negatively valenced and indicative of moody pondering. Examples are,
“Think: Why can’t I handle things better” and “Think: What am I doing to deserve this.”
Participants rate each item on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always).
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS).
Alexithymia is pervasive difficulty recognizing, describing, and responding to
one’s own feelings. Theoretically, alexithymia is nearly antithetical to emotional
articulacy. Mindfulness has also been shown to predict decreased alexithymia (Baer,
Smith, & Allen, 2004). Given this information, this study included a measure of
alexithymia take from Bagby, Parker, and Taylor’s (1993a) 20-item Toronto Alexithymia
Scale. Example items are, “I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling” and
“People tell me to describe my feelings more.” Respondents indicate on a scale of 1 to 5
how accurately each item describes them. The authors include three key factors in the
scale: Difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally
oriented feelings; however, all three items are quite interrelated. This study will simply
focus on global alexithymia scores as opposed to sub-factor scores. In a subsequent
study, Bagby, Parker, and Taylor (1993b) demonstrate that the TAS has convergent,
discriminant, and concurrent validity.
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Defensive Style Questionnaire (DSQ).
Oblivious mindlessness theoretically relies on immature defenses like denial,
repression, and projection to block emotionally challenging material from consciousness.
Andrews, Singh, and Bond (1993) provide a self- report measure of just such types of
defenses. Respondents use a 9-point Likert scale to indicate relative agreement or
disagreement with 40 items descriptive of the self. Twenty different “defenses” are each
represented by two items. Unfortunately, alpha coefficients for individual defenses were
mostly weak- to- moderate and thus did not meet psychometric requirements for
inclusion in this study. The authors also aggregated individual defenses into 3 factors:
mature, neurotic, and immature defenses. Only the immature defense factor had strong
internal reliability (Alpha = .89). Immature defenses positively predicted clinical status
among a normal sample and clinical samples with panic, social phobia, obsessive
compulsive disorders, and child abuse. Therefore, this factor was the only one included in
the current study’s analysis.
Relational Style Questionnaire.
This study will use a measure of adult attachment status or relational style
provided by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991). Relying on Bowlby’s theory that
individuals have an internal working model of both self and other, the authors create four
relational styles. They argue that the working model of self can reflect the belief that the
self is either worthy or unworthy of love and support. Likewise the model of others can
reflect a belief that others are either basically trustworthy or unreliable and rejecting.
They classify individuals with a positive self and other working model as secure and
describe them as “comfortable with intimacy and autonomy”. They describe those with a
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positive model of self and negative model of other as avoidant and describe them as
“dismissing of intimacy, counter dependent.” Those with a positive model of other and
negative model of self are preoccupied and conform to Main, et al.’s (1996) preoccupied
or enmeshed group. The “fearful” category entails both a negative model of self and
other and is “fearful of intimacy, socially avoidant.” The fearful attachment style does not
have a clear theoretical or empirical foundation in the existing attachment literature. It’s
theoretical relationship to oblivious and reactive mindlessness is also unclear. Therefore,
it will not be included in analyses. The relational questionnaire is composed of four short
paragraphs describing each of the four adult attachment styles. For example, the avoidant
paragraph reads, “I am comfortable without close emotional relationships. It is very
important to me to feel independent and self sufficient, and I prefer not to depend on
others or have others depend on me.” Participants simply read the four paragraphs and
check the paragraph that they feel best describes themself.
Vocabulary Subscale -Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition.
Verbal ability will likely affect some measures of narrative quality such as
Complexity. To account for this possibility, this study assessed verbal ability with the
Vocabulary Subscale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition. This
subtest entails defining 33 words of increasing difficulty. Sattler and Ryan (1998) found
that it was the most highly correlated subtest with general intelligence (r=.83). Kaufman
and Kaufman (1999) consider it to be a good measure of both verbal comprehension and
verbal expression. This study relied on the vocabulary subtest as a brief measure of
overall verbal ability.
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Chapter III
Results
Demographics
The sample consisted of 89 undergraduate participants who took part in the study
in exchange for extra credit or research requirements in a psychology class.
Demographic information was missing for two participants. The average age was 19.9
years old. 34% of the participants were male and 66% were female. The sample was
79% Caucasian, 16% African American, and 4% Asian American.
Reliability
Each participant’s narratives were randomly assigned to two of the six coders.
Interrater reliability was calculated for each chapter between rater one and rater two for
all narratives, allowing for a true coefficient of interrater reliability rather than reliance on
an initial estimate of reliability. Reliability was calculated using a one random effect
intraclass correlation coefficient, which is the most stringent relevant measure of
interrater agreement. Global reliability was calculated by averaging chapter level
intraclass correlation coefficients as this is a more stringent measure of reliability (See
Table 1). Global level reliability was strong, ranging from .806 to .943. Ambivalent
Emotional Articulacy was excluded from analyses due to insufficient variance in the
sample. Coefficient alphas were calculated to assess participants’ consistency across
narratives chapters for each narrative measure. Coefficient alphas ranged from .683 to
.806, which are relatively strong for five-item measures. It should be noted that
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Complexity scores were only calculated for two of the five narratives4. Thus the .683
alpha coefficient for Complexity is quite robust for a two-item measure. Measures of
internal consistency were also calculated for all self report measures (See Table 2).
Coefficient alphas were moderate to strong ranging from .701 to .908. All other selfreport measures also had alpha coefficients relatively consistent with those reported in the
sample reported by the authors of the measures.
Descriptive Statistics
The means of all measures were compiled (see table 3). The means of narrative
measures represent the average chapter score as opposed to average overall score. The
mean MAAS in this sample was extremely close to the mean MAAS score reported in the
normative community sample (Brown and Ryan, 2003). The mean score for the KIMS
scales were also very similar to the mean scores reported in Baer, Smith, and Allen’s
(2004) student samples. The greatest difference was for the KIMS ACT with Awareness
scale in which this study’s samples mean score of 27.29 was .33 of a standard deviation
lower than the two reported students samples. This study’s mean scores for all four
KIMS mindfulness scales were substantially higher than the mean scores for a sample
with borderline personality disorder (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). The largest
difference between this study’s samples and that of three samples reported on in the
original paper is that this study’s sample had substantially greater variance on all 4 KIMS
measures than each of the three original samples (see table 4 for a full comparison of
means and standard deviations). This sample was 3.56 points higher (.34 Standard
4

Calculating complexity requires assessing the complexity of representations of both the self and other.
Only narratives one and four entailed social interaction and thus consistently contained a representation of
an other.
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Deviations higher) on the Toronto Scale of Alexithymia than the normative sample
reported on by Bagby, Parker, & Taylor (1993a) which was also composed of
undergraduate students. This sample had higher Reflection scores of 1.28 points (.41
standard deviations) and higher Brooding scores of 2.51 points (.85 Standard Deviations)
than the normative sample reported on by Treynor, Gonzales, and Nolen-Hoeksema.
This difference may be attributable to age or occupation as our sample was composed of
undergraduates and the normative sample was composed of an adult community sample.
This sample reported higher Immature Defense on the DSQ than the normative sample
reported by Andrews, Singh, and Bond (1993). This is in accordance with the authors’
findings that younger participants report higher levels of Immature Defense. The mean
WAIS-III Vocabulary Subtest score of 47.7 translates into a scaled score of 13, which
indicates that the participants as a group showed higher than average verbal ability in
comparison to others their age.
In addition to demographics some other background information was also
gathered on the participants. As measured by the Relationship Questionnaire 43 percent
of this sample endorsed a secure adult attachment style (n=33), 24 percent endorsed an
fearful style (n=18), 13 percent a preoccupied style (n=10), and 20 percent an avoidant
style (n=15). Thirteen participants did not complete the RQ. These percentages are quite
similar to the distribution reported by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991). 17% of the
sample had engaged in psychotherapy, 12% had tried meditation, and 38% had kept a
journal, which are all variables thought to be relevant to mindfulness and
autobiographical narrative. 60% of the sample reported growing up in a suburban area,
20% in an urban area, and 20% in a rural area. SES was roughly assessed through
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tracking parents’ highest level of education. 1 % of parents had dropped out of high
school, 15% held only a high school diploma, 5% held a technical degree, 19% of fathers
and 23% of mothers had some college, 32% of mothers and 40% of fathers held a
bachelors’ level degree, and 25% of fathers and 16% of mothers held a graduate degree.
Hypotheses
All three primary hypotheses were tested both for main effects and for
interactions between attachment styles and measures of mindfulness. In order to reduce
the total number of analyses, simultaneous regressions were calculated testing a general
model that simultaneously assessed potential interactions between adult attachment styles
and each measure of mindfulness (See Appendices E1-I5). Specifically simultaneous
regression included only participants with a secure, avoidant and or preoccupied
attachment style. Attachment status was dummy-coded such that only interactions
between mindfulness preoccupied or avoidant attachment adult attachment styles were
assessed. When significant interactions were detected in the general model, individual
regressions were calculated to provide information about the unique relationship of
mindfulness and narrative measures specific to each attachment style. In summary,
although all statistics reported in the text are based upon individual regression equations,
such equations were only calculated when a simultaneous regression detected significant
interactions in the general model.
Hypothesis one states that mindfulness will predict narrative measures of
emotional articulacy, specifically for participants with an avoidant attachment style.
According to Pearson correlations, the MAAS and all four KIMS subscales showed no
main effects with Basic, Distinct, or Elaborated Emotional Articulacy (see Table 4).
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However, simultaneous regression models detected a number of significant interactions
(see Appendices F1-H5. Both avoidant and preoccupied groups demonstrated significant
relationships between mindfulness and emotional articulacy (See tables 7-9). Contrary to
the hypothesis, among participants reporting an avoidant attachment style, mindfulness
scales predicted decreased emotional articulacy. Specifically, high scores on the MAAS
predicted low Basic Emotional Articulacy (r2=.552, p= .004) and Elaborated Emotional
Articulacy (r2=.410, p= .018). KIMS Act with Awareness also inversely predicted Basic
Emotional Articulacy (r2=.597, p= .002), Distinct Emotional Articulacy (r2=.350, p=
.033), and Elaborated Emotional Articulacy (r2=.431, p= .015).
Mindfulness also predicted decreased emotional articulacy for participants
reporting a preoccupied attachment style. KIMS Acceptance predicted decreased Basic
(r2=.573, p= .018), Distinct (r2=.552, p= .015), and Elaborated Emotional Articulacy
(r2=.651, p< .001). KIMS Act with Awareness trended towards predicting Basic
Emotional Articulacy (r2=.359, p= .088) and significantly predicted Elaborated
Emotional Articulacy (r2=.458, p= .045).
Hypotheses two states that mindfulness will predict complexity of representations
of people. Correlations indicated that the MAAS and all four KIMS sub-scales had no
significant relationship with Complexity (See Table 4). There was a trend in the
predicted direction with KIMS Observe (r=.211, p=.059) and KIMS describe (r=.190,
p=.090) and in the reverse direction with KIMS Acceptance (r=.199, p=.079). This
predicted relationship was hypothesized to be true specifically for those with an avoidant
style of mindfulness. A simultaneous regression detected a significant interaction
between KIMS acceptance and adult attachment style (See Appendices E1-E5). An
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examination of individual regression equations revealed that avoidant participants
demonstrate the expected relationship with Complexity, such that high KIMS Acceptance
scores predict high Complexity scores (r2=.465, p= .010), providing support for
hypothesis two (See Table 10).
Hypothesis three states that mindfulness will predict increased narrative
coherence in negatively valenced chapters in comparison to positively valenced chapters,
as measured through Difference in Coherence Scores. In order to decrease the total
number of analyses, a global measure of Coherence was calculated. All three measures of
Coherence (Cohesion, Evaluation, and Structure) showed a high degree of
interrelationship (Cronbach’s alpha =.704) supporting their aggregation into a single
measure of coherence. Correlations revealed no significant main effects for mindfulness
and Difference Scores in Coherence (See Table 4). General regression model analyses
revealed no significant interactions between mindfulness measures and adult attachment
styles in predicting Difference in Coherence (See Appendices I1-I5).
Correlations between Mindfulness and Predicted Criterion
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS).
The MAAS predicted decreased Depression, (r=-.398, p <.001), Brooding (r=.460, p <.001), and Alexithymia (r=-.327, p =.002). The MAAS showed significant
positive relationships with all KIMS mindfulness scales. The MAAS showed no
significant relationship with Reflection, Defense Style, WAIS Vocabulary scores, or any
global narrative measures (See Table 5).
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Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS).
KIMS Observe predicted increased scores on the MAAS (r=.234, p =.030), KIMS
Describe (r=.438, p <.001), and Reflection (r=.426, p <.001). KIMS Observe also
negatively predicted KIMS Acceptance (r=-.299, p =.005), a relationship previously
documented by Baer, Smith, and Allen (2004). KIMS Describe was positively correlated
with all mindfulness scales except for KIMS Acceptance. KIMS Describe also predicts
low alexithymia, a relationship also documented by Baer, Smith, and Allen (2004). KIMS
Act with Awareness showed the strongest relationship with the MAAS (r=.547, p <.001)
of all of the KIMS scales and positively correlated with all mindfulness scales except
KIMS Observe. Not surprisingly the KIMS Act with Awareness subscale showed very
similar relationships to the MAAS with a number of other measures; it predicted
decreased score for Depression, (r=-.360, p =.001), scores (r=-.522, p <.001), and
Alexithymia (r=-.348, p =.002). In addition it predicted low Reflections scores (r=-.296,
p =.006). KIMS Acceptance had the strongest relationships of all mindfulness measures
with a number of self report criterion including Depression (r=-.531, p <.001), Reflection
(r=-.420, p<.001), Brooding (r=-.701, p <.001), and Alexithymia (r=-.609, p <.001.) In
addition it was the only mindfulness scale to show a significant relationship with DSQ
Immature Defenses (r=-.567, p <.001), although both the MAAS (r=-.224, p =.091), and
KIMS Describe (r=-.222, p =.094) demonstrated trends in a similar direction (See Table
5).
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Correlations of Narrative Measures and Predicted Criterion
Narrative measures demonstrated a number of meaningful relationships with other
variables despite their lack of relationship with mindfulness scales (See Table 6). Both
Reflection scores (r=.228, p=.041) and WAIS vocabulary scores (r=.282, p=.018)
predicted high Complexity scores. Neither Coherence or Difference in Coherence
showed significant relationships with any self report measures.
Emotional Articulacy demonstrated the greatest number of significant
relationships with self report measures. WAIS vocabulary scores predicted all forms of
emotional articulacy. Depression as assessed by the CESD was associated with high
scores for Distinct (r=.286, p=.014) and Elaborated Emotional Articulacy (r=.236,
p=.043) and with a trend towards high scores on Basic Emotional Articulacy (r=.223,
p=.056.) Distinct Emotional Articulacy also predicted Reflection (r=.255, p=.021) and
Brooding (r=.276, p=.014). Finally, Immature Defense predicted Distinct (r=.328,
p=.017) and Elaborated Emotional Articulacy (r=.347, p=.011).
Group Differences in Attachment Style
Adult attachment styles significantly differed on both self report and narrative
measures (see Table 11). One way ANOVA’s detected significant differences for
Complexity (F2,54=4.62, p=.014), Basic EA (F2,54=4.99, p=.010), Distinct EA (F2,54=3.69,
p=.032), Depression (F2,53=5.02, p=.010), Immature Defense (F2,39=5.25, p=.010), and
Alexithymia (F2,54=4.70, p=.013). A MANOVA detected significant differences between
relational styles for KIMS Describe (F2,53=4.56, p=.015) and KIMS Acceptance
(F2,54=3.81, p=.028). Post Hoc analyses (see Table 12) revealed several patterns.
Preoccupied participants demonstrated the highest means on all narrative measures. They
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also reported the highest depression scores and the lowest KIMS Acceptance Scores.
Avoidant participants had the lowest mean KIMS describe scores, the highest
Alexithymia score, and the highest Immature Defenses score. The secure group
demonstrated low scores on narrative measures and psychopathology and high
mindfulness scores.
The relationship between Emotional Articulacy and Depression and Brooding was
also assessed for each attachment style (see Table 12). For avoidant participants, Basic
Emotional Articulacy predicted Depression (r=.573, p=.041) and Brooding (r=.694,
p=.009), and Distinct Emotional Articulacy predicted Brooding (r=.663, p=.026). For
preoccupied participants, Basic Emotional Articulacy also predicted Brooding (r=.729,
p=.040).
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Chapter IV
Discussion
It seems fitting to begin this discussion of mindfulness and narrative with an
autobiographical story about mindfulness. The theory of oblivious and reactive
mindlessness has its origin in a meditation hall. Rays of late afternoon sun gently filtered
through a stained glass window, as I listened to my meditation teacher’s description of
different motivations behind meditation. He explained that two types of people are
drawn to meditation, “those whose hearts are closed in the front and can feel nothing; and
those whose hearts are open in the front but closed in the back, so they feel everything
but can let go of nothing.” This observation seemed to fit surprisingly well with
attachment theory. The emotional numbness of some meditators reminded me of the
cold emptiness described by a client of mine with an avoidant attachment style. Other
meditators’ inability to let go of experiences reminded me of the rumination and
emotional distress felt by those with a preoccupied attachment style. Extending the
analogy, mindfulness parallels secure attachment in that both involve open awareness
without over- reaction. Those parallels suggested to me that there could be two primary
styles of mindlessness, or distraction from full experience of the present moment, an
oblivious form based upon defensive avoidance of experience and a reactive form based
upon ruminative reaction to experience.
This present study was intended as the first step in assessing these ideas. An
overview of the reliability and validity of the study’s measures will allow for a better
understanding of the meaning and significance of the measures. The subsequent
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interpretation of the study’s results provides tentative support for the theory of oblivious
and reactive mindlessness. It also suggests that among individuals with an insecure
attachment style, mindfulness serves a protective factor against pathogenic rumination.
Finally, it highlights the importance of acceptance in understanding the benefits of
mindfulness.
Reliability and Validity
An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this study’s methods and
results will assist the subsequent interpretation of the results. Psychometrically, this
study is very strong. Internal reliability on all measures was similar and often superior to
reliability coefficients reported by measure’s authors, indicating that participants
responded to self report measures in a consistent manner. This is significant considering
that the self report measures were administered via computer even though they were
published as paper and pencil measures. The interrater reliability for most narrative
measures was quite high, and it was acceptable for all narrative measures. This indicates
that coders reliably measured the same construct. It does not, however, guarantee
construct validity, meaning that the construct measured may differ from the construct
studied in previous literature.
The current study replicated all previously documented relationships between
measures of mindfulness and other related criterion, which attests to the validity of
mindfulness measures as applied in this study. For example, both the KIMS and the
MAAS negatively predicted measures of depression, brooding, and alexithymia as
previously reported by Brown and Ryan (2003) and Baer, Smith, and Allen (2004). In
addition, both Reflection and WAIS vocabulary scores predicted high scores on Narrative
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Complexity. Furthermore, this study confirmed the hypothesized interaction between
mindfulness and avoidant attachment style in predicting complexity scores. These
findings suggest that the Complexity coding measure was applied in a manner consistent
the with underlying construct and previous research.
In contrast both Emotional Articulacy and Coherence appear to have more limited
construct validity. Emotional Articulacy appears to be a different construct than was
initially considered. As expected the index was positively correlated with both
Reflection and verbal ability, as measured by WAIS vocabulary scores. Surprisingly,
however, Emotional Articulacy also showed positive relationships with all measures of
psychopathology: Depression, Brooding, and Immature defenses. Furthermore, although
prior experience in psychotherapy predicted psychopathology (r=.301, p=.007) it did not
significantly predict any type of Emotional Articulacy, which rules out past therapy
experience as a potential confound explaining the relationship between EA and
psychopathology.
Several finding suggest that this relationship is due to Emotional Articulacy
serving as a marker of emotional rumination. The preoccupied adult attachment style is
known to predict increased accessibility to negative emotions and increased intensity of
affect associated with recall of negative emotional memories (Mikulincer & Orbach,
1995). In the present study, participants with a preoccupied adult attachment style
demonstrated the highest mean emotional articulacy. EA serving as a marker of
emotional rumination would also explain its relationships with depression and brooding.
As such emotional articulacy would be more aptly conceived as a risk rather than a
resiliency factor.
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Of all the narrative coding measures included in this study, the Emotional
Articulacy scale showed the greatest predictive power for all self report scales, including
Depression, Rumination, Reflection, Immature Defense, and WAIS Vocabulary scores.
As such, it appear to be an important complement to existing narrative measures.
However, before it can be fully utilized, further research is required to clarify the
underlying construct. It demonstrates seemingly paradoxical relationships with other
criteria, predicting both psychological risk factors and psychological resiliency factors.
One possibility that explains these apparently contradictory findings is that the function
or significance of Emotional Articulacy differs across types of participants. Specifically,
examining the differing significance of Emotional Articulacy as a function of adult
attachment status potentially clarifies these findings (see table 14). For participants
reporting an avoidant adult attachment style, measures of Emotional Articulacy predicted
Depression and Rumination, and for participants reporting a preoccupied adult
attachment status they also predicted Brooding. In contrast, the secure groups show no
significant relationships between Emotional Articulacy and self report measures of
Depression and Brooding. Given that these findings are based upon post hoc analyses
conducted with very sample sizes, their significance is quite tentative. That caveat aside,
they suggest that Emotional Articulacy has a different function for different attachment
groups. It appears to be a risk factor for pathogenic rumination only for participants with
an insecure attachment style. These findings are especially significant because, as will be
discussed in the hypotheses section, they also help potentially clarify why the different
adult attachment groups show disparate relationships between mindfulness and
Emotional Articulacy.
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The Emotional Articulacy measure could prove useful as a new construct with
which to describe narrative, and as such it adds to the existing array of narrative coding
measures. It would be useful, for example, in studies of attachment related narratives or
in longitudinal research examining risk factors of pathology.
If replicated, the results regarding the differing function of emotional articulacy
for different attachment groups would also have important implications for clinical
practice. Many types of therapy, particularly exploratory and insight oriented, focus on
the facilitation of patients’ development of emotional articulacy, based on the idea that
such capacity to observe, describe, and reflect on emotional experience will lead to better
emotional regulation and ultimately more adaptive behavior. For example, Linehan’s
(1993) Dialectal Behavior Therapy emphasizes learning to identify emotional states as a
part of the development of emotion regulation skills. However, the current findings
suggest that emotional articulacy has different value for different types of participants,
and is likely to serve as a resiliency factor for some and a risk factor others. For example,
increasing the already excessive emotional articulacy of a patient with a preoccupied
adult attachment style could perhaps be iatrogenic. Ultimately, it is possible that a better
understanding of the interaction between emotional articulacy and attachment status
could assist in the selection of the best type of therapy for specific types of patients.
Contrary to expectations, narrative coherence had no predictive power. Narrative
coherence is typically associated with a secure attachment style (Main, 1996;
Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) and psychological well being (e.g. Oppenheim, Nir,
Warren, & Emde, 1997; van IJzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996). The present
study detected no significant differences between attachment groups for Coherence. The
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narrative coherence measures in the present study were directly adapted from Baerger
and McAdams (1999) Structural and Integrative coherence indices, both of which
predicted decreased Depression scores as assessed with the CESD. The present study also
failed to replicate these relationships with the CESD. Thus, it is reasonable to wonder if
this study failed to operationalize narrative coherence according to its conventional
meaning and in a manner consistent with existing literature. Two likely explanations of
this are a halo effect among coders and inclusion of only select subfactors of coherence.
There is some evidence of a potential halo effect among narrative raters. First
explicated by Thorndike (1920), a halo effect entails allowing judgment of one key
category to affect judgment of other unrelated categories. The high degree of correlation
between all narrative measures indicates that raters may have used some key measures to
identify narratives as strong and poor and rated all other narrative measures accordingly
(see table 7). Complexity and Emotional Articulacy show unique patterns of
relationships with multiple criteria, suggesting little if any potential halo effect. In
contrast, Coherence shows none of the expected relationships with other criteria. An
examination of the narrative properties of each attachment group specifically suggest that
Coherence scores may have been affected by Complexity and EA scores. Bartholomew
and Horowitz (1991) reported that the narratives of preoccupied participants
demonstrated significantly higher “Elaboration” and significantly lower “Coherence”
than did those of other attachment groups. Complexity and Emotional Articulacy are
closely related constructs to Elaboration. In accordance with prior findings, preoccupied
participants in the present study showed the highest mean Complexity and Emotional
Articulacy. Contradicting prior findings, however, preoccupied participants also had the
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highest mean Coherence scores, a difference that was marginally statistically significant
(see table 13). One likely explanation of this discrepancy is a halo effect: Participants’
scores on Complexity and Emotional Articulacy affected their scores on Coherence, thus
compromising the validity of the Coherence measure.
Another potential detriment to the construct validity of coherence is the exclusion
of several sub-factors of coherence. Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) theory of four types
of narrative coherence provided the theoretical rationale for this study’s
operationalization of coherence. In a review article, Habermas and Bluck theorize that
coherence of adolescents’ narratives can be fully assessed with four sub-factors:
temporal, biographical, causal, and thematic. All fundamentally adequate narratives will
demonstrate chronological organization (temporal coherence) and will include the basic
and essential elements of a life story (biographical coherence). These two fundamental
types of coherence define a narrative; they are the basic requirements of an adequate
autobiographical narrative. In contrast, the authors argue, it is causally linking life events
(causal coherence) and extracting common themes that provide continuity and identity
(thematic coherence) that differentiate better and worse quality narratives. We assumed
that a sample of college undergraduates would have at least average narrative abilities,
and hence should also demonstrate adequate temporal and biographical coherence.
Furthermore, the primary focus of the study was affective interference with coherence.
We theorized that the more advanced components, causal and thematic coherence, would
be the most likely to show impairment due to affective interference.
Thus we focused on causal and thematic coherence, which we operationalized
with Baerger and McAdam’s (1999) Structural and Integrative Indices, two of four
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indices that compose the Life Story Coherence Measure. During the training process, we
broke the Integrative index into two subfactors: cohesion and evaluation. Given the large
number of variables, coders already had to assess for each narrative we did not code for
Affective or Orientative Coherence, the other two indices that composed the Life Story
Coherence Measure. Thus in both its theoretical foundation (e.g. Habermas & Bluck,
2000) and its actual operationalization (Baerger & McAdam’s, 1999) this study
selectively focused on only half of the subcomponents of coherence. Although there
were clear rationales behind this decision, in retrospect it appears that focusing
selectively on some subcomponents while ignoring others may have lead to a failure to
adequately measure coherence as a whole.
Speculations
The prior clarification of the study’s methods, specifically the reliability and
validity of its measures, provides a more accurate interpretative context in which to make
sense of its results. The key findings in this study hinge upon the interaction of
mindfulness and attachment style in predicting narrative measures. It should be noted
that insufficient sample sizes among the avoidant and preoccupied attachment groups
leave these findings quite speculative due to vulnerability to Type 1 Error. That caveat
aside, these findings provide tentative support for underlying theory of avoidant and
reactive mindlessness.
To review, the theoretical rationale for this study is based upon the theory that
there are two different form of mindlessness. Oblivious mindlessness entails the active
use of avoidant defenses to keep threatening information outside of consciousness.
Reactive mindlessness, on the other hand, results when such information is admitted to
65

consciousness and emotional reaction results. It entails an inability to accept such
information and “let go of it,” and instead rumination and emotional dysregulation ensue.
As discussed above, avoidant and preoccupied attachment styles have clear parallels to
oblivious and reactive mindlessness respectively, but they are not synonymous
constructs. For example, we would expect most participants with an avoidant attachment
style to show relatively high levels of oblivious mindlessness. However, it would be
possible for an avoidant individual to be relatively mindful of his avoidant relational
pattern and his associated emotional reactions. Likewise, an avoidant individual will
likely fall into a state of reactive mindlessness if avoidant defenses fail and threatening
information becomes conscious.
Avoidant participants demonstrated many of the qualities associated with
oblivious mindlessness. As theorized, avoidant participants showed the highest levels of
Immature Defenses. Their narratives had low levels of Complexity and Emotional
Articulacy. They also reported significantly higher levels of mindlessness, as measured
by KIMS Describe, and higher levels of Alexithymia than any other attachment group.
This attests to their avoidance of recognizing and verbalizing many aspects of their
experience. Together these findings paint a picture of avoidant defenses blocking
threatening information about emotions, the self, and others from consciousness and from
inclusion in an autobiographical narrative.
Avoidant participants who are also low in mindfulness were thought to exemplify
oblivious mindlessness. We predicted that these participants would show the lowest
levels of complexity due to continual schematic processing, in which certain beliefs and
assumptions about the world are constantly used to interpret and understand experience
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and also rigidly defended from new, schema-discordant information. Although the data
supported this hypothesis, it also suggested a revision to theory of oblivious
mindlessness. Based on Bishop’s two-factor theory of mindfulness, we had theorized
that a lack of awareness causes oblivious mindlessness. However, KIMS Acceptance, as
opposed to other scales more directly related to awareness (such as the MAAS or KIMS
Observe), was the mindfulness subfactor that predicted increased complexity for avoidant
participants. This indicates that a lack of acceptance for avoidant individuals is a driving
factor behind their overly simplistic narratives, and more generally that a lack of
acceptance may be a key factor behind oblivious mindlessness, rather than the awareness
construct originally thought to play a crucial role
One factor that may explain this is the active use of immature defenses like
projection and denial, which block emotionally threatening or schema discordant material
from consciousness. Immature defenses were significantly higher for avoidant
participants and for participants with low levels of KIMS Acceptance. These defenses
are theorized to be the mechanism through which oblivious mindlessness is maintained.
This suggests that the less able someone is to accept experiences or facts, the more likely
they are to use avoidant defenses to maintain a lack of awareness of that material. In
contrast, those individuals with greater acceptance are likely to be less emotionally
threatened by material and therefore likely to admit a greater variety of information into
consciousness, ultimately resulting in more complex representations of self and other.
We also predicted that mindfulness would increase emotional articulacy for
avoidant participants. The data contradicted this hypothesis; mindfulness was associated
with decreased emotional articulacy for avoidant participants. This finding, however,
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makes sense in light of our revised understanding of Emotional Articulacy, specifically
that EA predicts Depression and Brooding amongst avoidant participants.
A speculative synthesis of these findings casts EA in the role of an indicator of
the breakdown of typical avoidant defenses. Avoidant participants are theorized to have
a high frequency of oblivious mindlessness, in which avoidant defenses preclude full
consciousness and experience of negative emotions. However, it is possible for these
defenses to fail and for emotionally challenging material to surface into consciousness.
Perhaps EA is a sign of this state5, which would explain why it predicts both Depression
and Brooding.
One specific component of mindfulness appears to protect avoidant participants
from entering into this distressing, ruminative state. The MAAS and KIMS, the two
mindfulness measures that predict decreased Emotional Articulacy for avoidant
participants, are conceptually and empirically quite similar. They show the highest
correlation of all mindfulness subscales. Both involve a focus on maintaining awareness
of one’s actions in the present moment. Similar to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) concept of
“flow,” both scales entail a single- minded absorption in the activity of the moment.
Such absorption in the present moment clearly will preclude rumination. Thus, avoidant
participants appear to use a focus on the events of the present moment in order to
maintain their avoidance of emotional difficulties and thus protect themselves from
depression and associated brooding. In other words, the present moment focused aspect
of mindfulness may actually serve a defensive function against brooding on events of the

5

This state actually would be best characterized as reactive mindlessness. Avoidant participants demonstrating
reactive mindlessness illustrates that attachment style and oblivious and reactive mindlessness are separate constructs.
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past or future. For example, while driving to work a hypothetical avoidant individual
could simply focus on driving and listening to the radio, thus shutting out thoughts and
feelings about a recent death in the family. If this were the case, such absorption in the
present moment simultaneously serves a protective function against painful rumination
but also bolsters defensive avoidance.
The case for reactive mindlessness is simpler and more straightforward. Reactive
mindlessness is theoretically driven by a difficulty in accepting life events, which leads to
subsequent emotional reaction and rumination. As expected, the preoccupied group, who
are theoretically the most vulnerable to reactive mindlessness, fit this description in many
ways. Lack of acceptance was theorized to cause reactive mindlessness, and preoccupied
participants demonstrated the lowest KIMS Acceptance scores of all attachment groups.
They experience the highest mean levels of Depression, demonstrating their vulnerability
to distress. Their narratives also demonstrate the highest levels of Complexity and
Emotional Articulacy, likely because of their ruminative preoccupation with relationships
and emotions.
Although reactive mindlessness and preoccupied attachment style show several
similarities they are not synonymous, which is illustrated by the interaction of
mindfulness and preoccupied attachment style. For preoccupied participants, Emotional
Articulacy is an indicator of Rumination. Preoccupied participants with higher levels of
Acceptance demonstrate decreases in their otherwise excessive emotional articulacy.
Thus mindfulness, and particularly the acceptance aspect of mindfulness, functions as a
protective factor against preoccupied individuals’ natural tendency to ruminate on
emotionally challenging material.
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Implications for Future Research
Though the evidence is quite tentative due to small sample size, this study
provides some support for the reactive and oblivious conceptualization of mindlessness.
The development of direct measures of these types of mindlessness will be the next step
in their exploration and will also allow for clarification of their relationship with
attachment style. Given the several significant interactions between mindfulness and
attachment style in the present study, future studies of mindfulness may consider
inclusion of attachment measures. Outcome studies on mindfulness based interventions
could potentially find different outcomes for preoccupied and avoidant participants. For
example, this study suggests that increasing avoidant participants’ capacity for absorption
in the present moment may actually be a mixed blessing: strengthening their avoidant
style while simultaneously reducing rumination and subjective experiences of distress.
The findings also highlight the crucial role of acceptance in mindfulness. Acceptance
appears to have beneficial effects for both avoidant and preoccupied participants. It also
appears to play a more important role in oblivious mindlessness than we initially
theorized. Furthermore, the KIMS Acceptance measure was the strongest predictor of
low levels of all measures of pathology included in this study. Acceptance is clearly a
potent aspect of quantifying mindfulness in a self- report format, as would be predicted
based upon Bishop et al’s (2004) two factor model of mindfulness. This implies that
other studies relying solely on the MAAS should also consider including the KIMS
Acceptance scale.
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TABLES
Table 1
Reliability Statistics for Narrative Measures
Intraclass

Cronbach’s

Correlation

Alpha

Coefficients
Complexity

.892

.683

Coherence

.806

.806

Basic EA

.943

.720

Distinct EA

.919

.683

Elaborated EA

.783

.705
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Table 2
Internal Cohesion for Self Report Measures
Alpha Coefficients
MAAS

.879

KIMS Observe

.867

KIMS Describe

.899

KIMS Awareness

.701

KIMS Accept

.887

CES-D

.908

TAS

.839

RRQ Reflection

.822

RRQ Rumination

.810

DSQ Immature

.866
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Study’s Sample
Standard

Reported Normative Sample
Mean

Standard

Mean

Deviation

3.96

.86

3.97

.64

KIMS Observe

38.18

9.37

37.62

7.55

KIMS Describe

27.09

7.29

27.91

5.94

5.73

29.05

5.41

MAAS

KIMS Act with
Awareness

27.29

Deviation

KIMS Acceptance

29.69

7.60

29.86

6.67

CESD

35.18

10.51

*

*

Reflection

11.11

4.07

9.83

3.11

Brooding

11.91

3.74

9.40

2.96

Alexithymia

50.95

11.50

47.39

10.37

3.95

1.19

3.54

.95

47.68

8.23

36

*

Complexity

2.86

.97

*

*

Basic EA

4.56

1.52

*

*

Distinct EA

2.24

1.52

*

*

.19

.32

*

*

Coherence

12.41

3.71

*

*

Difference in

-.319

1.07

*

*

DSQ Immature
WAIS Verbal

Elaborated EA

Coherence
* indicates not available
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Table 4
Correlations between Mindfulness Scales and Narrative Measures
MAAS

KIMS

KIMS

KIMS Act

KIMS

Observe

Describe

with

Acceptance

Awareness
Complexity

Basic EA

Distinct EA

Elaborated
EA
Coherence

Difference in
Coherence

Pearson r

-.120

.211

.190

-.061

-.199

Sig. (2 tailed)

.288

.059

.090

.595

.079

Pearson r

-.010

.083

.130

-.072

-.082

Sig. (2 tailed)

.930

.464

.248

.528

.470

Pearson r

-.086

.147

.104

-.124

-.184

Sig. (2 tailed)

.450

.192

.355

.277

.104

Pearson r

-.112

.100

.165

-.185

-.181

Sig. (2 tailed)

.321

.375

.140

.102

.111

Pearson r

-.054

.122

.090

-.092

-.097

Sig. (2 tailed)

.635

.279

.422

.418

.393

Pearson r

.089

-.008

-.002

.141

-.010

Sig. (2 tailed)

.433

.941

.986

.215

.932
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Table 5
Correlation of Mindfulness Scales with Other Self Report Measures

MAAS

CESD

Reflection

Brooding

Alexithymia

DSQ Immature

WAIS Verbal

MAAS

KIMS Describe

KIMS Act with
Awareness
KIMS
Acceptance

KIMS

Observe

Describe

KIMS Act
with
Awareness

KIMS
Acceptance

Pearson r

-.398

.130

-.199

-.360

-.531

Sig. (2 tailed)

.000

.249

.079

.001

.000

Pearson r

-.086

.426

.099

-.296

-.420

Sig. (2 tailed)

.430

.000

.365

.006

.000

Pearson r

-.460

.146

-.191

-.522

-.701

Sig. (2 tailed)

.000

.183

.082

.000

.000

Pearson r

-.327

.110

-.308

-.348

-.609

Sig. (2 tailed)

.002

.315

.004

.001

.000

Pearson r

-.224

.178

-.222

-.181

-.567

Sig. (2 tailed)

.091

.181

.094

.174

.000

Pearson r

-.047

.020

.204

-.093

.078

Sig. (2 tailed)

.798

.865

.083

.429

.513

.234

.378

.547

.312

.030

.000

.000

.004

1

.438

.096

-.299

Sig. (2 tailed)

.000

.380

.005

Pearson r

1

237

.161

Sig. (2 tailed)

.030

.145

Pearson r

1

.364

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

KIMS Observe

KIMS

1

Pearson r

Sig. (2 tailed)

.001

Pearson r

1

Sig. (2 tailed)
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Table 6
Narrative Measures Correlations
Complexity

Basic
EA

Distinct Elaborated
EA
EA

Coherence

Difference
in
Coherence
-.164
.161

CESD

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.169
.149

.223
.056

.286
.014

.236
.043

.204
.281

Reflection

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.228
.041

.128
.254

.255
.021

.109
.334

.156
.165

-.072
.522

Brooding

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.136
.232

.132
.246

.276
.014

.190
.093

.097
.396

-.174
.126

Alexithymia

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.036
.750

.062
.592

.187
.097

.095
.400

-.018
.876

-.077
.500

DSQ
Immature

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.213
.125

.202
.146

.328
.017

.347
.011

.245
.077

.234
.091

WAIS
Vocabulary

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.282
.018

.302
.011

.273
.022

.280
.019

.200
.098

.057
.636

Complexity

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

1

.586
.000

.688
.000

.621
.000

.686
.000

-.168
.130

Basic EA

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

1

.798
.000

.724
.000

.683
.000

-.231
.036

Distinct EA

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

1

.780
.000

.586
.000

-.221
.045

Elaborated EA

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

.613
.000

-.111
.318

Coherence

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

1

-.116
.297

Difference in
Coherence

Pearson r
Sig. (2 tailed)

1

1
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Table 7
Mindfulness by relational style as a predictor of Basic Emotional Articulacy
Relational

r

R squared

Beta

Significance

Secure

.188

.035

.258

.304

Preoccupied

-.379

.144

-1.373

.314

Avoidant

-.743

.552

-1.298

.004

Style

MAAS

Non-Significant General Model

KIMS Observe

KIMS

Non-Significant General Model

Describe
KIMS Act

Secure

.184

.034

-.535

.305

with

Preoccupied

-.599

.359

-3.731

.088

Awareness

Avoidant

-.772

.597

-3.177

.002

Secure

.122

.015

.274

.507

Preoccupied

-.757

.573

-4.279

.018

Avoidant

-.233

.054

-1.118

.443

KIMS
Acceptance
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Table 8
Mindfulness by Relational Style as a Predictor of Distinct Emotional Articulacy
Relational

r

R squared

Beta

Significance

Secure

.066

.004

.075

.720

Preoccupied

-.555

.308

-.307

.121*

Avoidant

-.466

.218

-.518

.108

Style

MAAS

Non-Significant General Model

KIMS Observe

KIMS

Non-Significant General Model

Describe
KIMS Act

Secure

-.028

.001

-.015

.879

with

Preoccupied

-.526

.277

-.169

.146

Awareness

Avoidant

-.592

.350

-.279

.033

Secure

-.002

.000

-.001

.991

Preoccupied

-.771

.594

-.273

.015

Avoidant

-.087

.008

-.035

.778

KIMS
Acceptance

*relationship significant in general model but not in individual regression
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Table 9
Mindfulness by Relational Style as a Predictor of Elaborated Emotional Articulacy
Relational

r

R squared

Beta

Significance

Secure

.074

.005

.413

.688

Preoccupied

-.541

.292

-1.358

.133

Avoidant

-.640

.410

-2.753

.018

Style

MAAS

KIMS Observe

KIMS
Describe

Non-Significant General Model

Secure

.310

.096

.310

.079

Preoccupied

-.008

.000

.008

.984

Avoidant

.449

.201

-.449

.124

KIMS Act

Secure

-.104

.011

-.269

.563

with

Preoccupied

-.677

.458

-.988

.045

Awareness

Avoidant

-.657

.431

-1.199

.015

Secure

-.030

.001

-.117

.869

Preoccupied

-.807

.651

-1.298

.009

Avoidant

-.117

.014

-.184

.703

KIMS
Acceptance
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Table 10
Mindfulness by Relational Style as a Predictor of Complexity
Relational
Style
MAAS

r

R squared

Beta

Significance

Non-Significant General Model

KIMS

Non-Significant General Model

Observe
KIMS

Non-Significant General Model

Describe
KIMS Act
with

Non-Significant General Model

Awareness
KIMS
Acceptance

Secure

-.252

.064

-.107

.164

Preoccupied

-.494

.244

-.382

.176

Avoidant

.682

.465

.421

.010

98

Table 11
Group Differences in Narrative and Self Report Means by Adult Attachment Status
Secure

Preoccupied

Avoidant

F

p

Mean

Mean

Mean

Basic EA

38.42b

62.71a

32.77b

4.99

.010

Distinct EA

18.76b

31.11a

18.46

3.69

.032

1.27

3.72

1.54

2.73

.074

Complexity

10.67b

14.44a

10.38b

4.62

.014

Coherence

11.69

14.36

11.63

2.47

.094

-0.20

-0.61

-0.71

.41

.748

CESD Total

30.10a

40.30b

36.33

5.24

.003

Reflection

10.03

12.20

11.47

1.36

.265

Brooding

10.81

13.00

12.80

2.34

.106

DSQ Immature

83.55a

84.33

105.33b

5.25

.010

Alexithymia

46.63a

50.60

55.33b

4.70

.013

MAAS

61.19

59.90

53.00

2.52

.090

KIMS Observe

37.06

38.40

37.47

.114

.892

KIMS Describe

29.52a

30.40a

24.00b

4.56

.015

27.39

28.80

27.47

.324

.725

33.03a

27.80b

29.47

3.81

.028

Elaborated EA

Difference in
Coherence

KIMS Act with
Awareness
KIMS Acceptance

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly at p<.05 according to Tukey
HSD pairwise comparisons.
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Table 12
Correlations of Emotional Articulacy with Measures of Psychopathology
Adult
Attachment
Status
Secure

Depression

Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance

Basic_EA

Preoccupied Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance

Basic_EA

Avoidant

Basic_EA

Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance
Pearson r
Significance

Distinct_EA
Elaborated_EA

Distinct_EA
Elaborated_EA

Distinct_EA
Elaborated_EA
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Brooding

-.066
.723
.069
.711
.184
.322

.156
.394
.266
.141
.037
.839

.054
.890
.139
.721
.858
.070

.729
.040
.608
.110
.603
.113

.573
.041
.293
.331
.363
.222

.694
.009
.599
.030
.512
.073

Appendix A
Interview Template

Let me explain what is going on with this study. We are looking at how people think
about and tell their life story. We are not studying pathology or trying to label anything
as crazy, but rather just studying the different ways that people make sense of and talk
about their own lives. Towards that end I will be asking you six question about your own
life. Most people take some time after they hear the question to reflect and gather their
thoughts before they begin to answer. The focus is on the most meaningful or important
experiences you’ve had, rather than just the most recent, so feel free to take as long as
you want to think before you answer.
Some of the questions I will be asking are about pretty tough stuff. I’d like to encourage
you to be open and share as much as you can, as we are most interested in how people
make sense of some of the difficult and painful parts of their own life history; however,
you are free to stop answering a question anytime you like. Everything you say is
confidential, in other words is secret and will not be revealed to anyone not working on
the experiment. Your tape will not leave the lab and will not have your name on it. This
is not therapy, rather we just want to hear about how you make sense of your life. This
should take at least twenty to thirty minutes. Do you have any questions before we start?
1. We’ll start with an easy question: What has been the high point of your year?
2. Tell me about a pleasant interaction you have had with a close friend. Please include
what led up to the event, what happened as a result, and what you and the other person
were thinking and feeling.
(That really sounds great/fun)
3. Please describe for me a peak experience. By that I mean one of the moments that you
felt that happiest, that felt the most pivotal in defining who you are, or reminding yourself
of what it is that you live for.
(That must have been really special)
4. Please describe for me the opposite of a peak experience: the lowest point in your life,
when things were the most miserable or difficult.
(I can see why that would be so hard)
5. Tell me about a time that you felt betrayed by someone. Please choose a different topic
than the last narrative. Please include what led up to the event, what happened as a result,
and what you and the other person were thinking and feeling.
(Wow that is really hurtful/ pretty horrible!)
6. Tell me about an experience you have had in nature, in other words outdoors.
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Appendix B
Emotional Articulacy Index

I. Basic:
a. Undifferentiated Description: The narrator uses affectively charged words (e.g.
bad, good, sucks) that convey global affect without differentiation of a particular
type of affect.
b. Physiology of Emotion: Narrator describes a physical reaction to the situation.
(e.g. “It made me feel sick to my stomach”).
c. Relational: words that describe increasing or decreasing feelings of intimacy or
closeness: (e.g. bonding, grew apart, trust, I like Joan, etc.)
II. Distinct: The narrator uses a single emotional word to describe his or her
emotional reaction. Now includes implied emotional description if distinct.
III. Elaborated: thoughts, emotions, or contextual explanation that provides a
more distinct feeling or understanding of the speaker’s subjective experience.
Elaboration means narrowing down from general categories of emotional experience to a
subcategory. It is going beyond the barebones required contextualization and making the
extra effort to make the emotional state come alive. Elaboration may make you feel
empathy for the narrator. It can be a list of differing emotional states. It can be the
thoughts or associated cognitive meanings of the event but it must also contain the
emotional experience It can be background contextual information (i.e. History or life
patterns) that provide insight into the specific meaning of that experience.
IIII. Ambivalence:
Ambivalence is defined as two or more emotional reactions to the same phenomena
or experience. They need be connected – so the narrator is clearly showing they
recognize two emotions at the same time. Although they do not have to be complete
distinct emotional states they cannot be to undifferentiated. (“I was upset” could be
marginally OK if other emotional state is distinct. In contrast “it was also good” without
further clarification or explanation is too indistinct no matter how distinct the other
emotional state) Frequently connection phrase will be used like “at the same time I also
felt”, or “I was conflicted…”, or “I felt more than one thing…” An example of
ambivalence is, “I was really sad when he left. And at the same time I have this strange
feeling of peace and freedom – like I could do whatever I wanted with my life.”)
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Appendix C
Revised Structure Guidelines
The focus here is to what extent does the narrative contain the traditional elements of a
story and to what extent are those elements causally and temporally connected to create a
sense of “story-ness.” High scoring narratives should “feel” like a good narrative.
Beginning: The introduction. This provides some background information about what
led up the event. Score 2 for excellent, 1 for weak or iffy, and 0 for absent.
Middle: The meat of the story. The primary actions and events. Score 2 for excellent, 1
for weak or iffy, and 0 for absent.

End: The Consequence. What happened because of the middle of the story. Score 2 for
excellent, 1 for weak or iffy, and 0 for absent.

Causation: Do the events in the beginning cause the middle, and do the middle events
cause the end. Use your judgment because this can be implicit. Score 1 for strong and o
for weak.
The ratings should be wholistic. Rate the narrative as a whole. For example, if it has a
large amount of material that does not fit into any category that should weaken scores of
adjacent parts of the narrative. Or if there are multiple middles of the narrative, they all
need to be strong in order to score a 2.
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Appendix D
Integration Guidelines: Evaluation and Cohesion
Evaluation: Does the narrator explain the overall significance or meaning of the event in
the context of their life as a whole.
3. Complex Integration: Multiple events tied together to illustrate the self-defining
integration
2. Self-Defining Integration: What the narrator learned form the experience, the moral
of the story, or a statement about the permanent effect of the event on the narrator
1. Integration by Comparison: Narrator compares event to the rest of life. An
example is, “This was a real low point for me because…” or “This was one of the
only times that I felt ….”
0. No integration: The coder is left wondering why the narrator even discussed the
topic.

Cohesion: Do all the components of the narrative fit together into a cohesive whole?
4. Excellent Structure: Narrative excels in the following ways
a. Main Point: Narrator has clearly stated or implied topic.
b. Repetition: less than 1 in 5 sentences are redundant and add no information
c. Unresolved Contradictions: Contradictions are absent or recognized
d. Tangents: Material is unrelated to the main point of the narrative.
3. Good Structure: Minor problems are present.
2. Moderate Structure: Major problems but narrative is still an intelligible whole. (e.g.
a serious problem in 1 category)
1. Poor Structure: Either it is unclear what the main point of the narrative is, or the
narrative shows severe problems with contradictions, tangents, or repetition. (e.g.
serious problems in multiple categories)
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Appendix E1
General Regression Model for MAAS and Adult Attachment Style as Predictors of
Complexity

(Constant)
MAAS
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

16.668
-.097
-3.374
-3.959
.116
.051

3.537
.057
7.177
5.545
.118
.100

4.712
-1.699
-.470
-.714
.987
.504

.000
.096
.640
.479
.329
.616
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Appendix E2
General Regression Model for KIMS Observe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Complexity

B
(Constant)
KIMS Observe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

8.899
.048
.271
.310
.084
-.017

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

2.431
.063
7.223
5.110
.179
.130

3.661
.752
.037
.061
.469
-.131

.001
.456
.970
.952
.641
.896
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Appendix E3
General Regression Model for KIMS Describe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Complexity

(Constant)
KIMS Describe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

8.447
.075
-8.992
.114
.407
.002

2.956
.098
7.165
4.797
.229
.183

2.858
.766
-1.255
.024
1.777
.008

.006
.447
.215
.981
.082
.993
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Appendix E4
General Regression Model for KIMS Act with Awareness and Adult Attachment
Style as Predictors of Complexity

(Constant)
KIMS Act with
Awareness
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

11.042

3.313

3.332

.002

-.014

.119

-.115

.909

12.502
.164
-.321
-.018

5.926
6.121
.212
.226

2.110
.027
-1.513
-.078

.040
.979
.137
.938
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Appendix E5
General Regression Model for KIMS Acceptance and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Complexity

(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

14.26
-.107
10.45
-15.96
-.275
.528

2.904
.086
5.057
6.740
.172
.227

4.913
-1.246
2.068
-2.368
-1.600
2.331

.000
.219
.044
.022
.116
.024
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Appendix F1
General Regression Model for MAAS and Adult Attachment Style as Predictors of
Basic Emotional Articulacy
B
(Constant)
MAAS
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

22.453
.258
122.18
7
75.694
-1.631
-1.555

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

21.806
.351

1.030
.734

.308
.466

44.245

2.762

.008

34.184
.725
.618

2.214
-2.251
-2.516

.032
.029
.015
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Appendix F2
General Regression Model for KIMS Observe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Basic Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Observe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

33.178
.142
-.411
45.314
.605
-1.330

15.804
.412
46.956
33.221
1.161
.848

2.099
.343
-.009
1.364
.521
-1.568

.041
.733
.993
.179
.605
.123
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Appendix F3
General Regression Model for KIMS Describe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Basic Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Describe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

17.808
.699
-42.90
48.124
2.124
-2.094

19.375
.643
46.966
31.445
1.499
1.197

.919
1.086
-.913
1.530
1.416
-1.749

.363
.283
.365
.132
.163
.086
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Appendix F4
General Regression Model for KIMS Act with Awareness and Adult Attachment
Style as Predictors of Basic Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Act with
Awarenss
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

53.072

18.732

2.833

.007

-.535

.672

-.795

.430

111.21
63.031
-3.197
-2.642

33.503
34.605
1.198
1.280

3.320
1.821
-2.668
-2.064

.002
.075
.010
.044
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Appendix F5
General Regression Model for KIMS Acceptance and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Basic Emotional Articulacy

B
(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

29.441
.274
148.31
8
35.403
-4.553
-1.392

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

17.707
.526

1.663
.522

.103
.604

30.840

4.809

.000

41.099
1.048
1.382

.861
-4.345
-1.007

.393
.000
.319
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Appendix G1
General Regression Model for MAAS and Adult Attachment Style as Predictors of
Distinct Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
MAAS
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

15.041
.058
76.029
24.569
-1.063
-.478

11.931
.192
24.207
18.703
.396
.338

1.261
.302
3.141
1.314
-2.682
-1.413

.214
.764
.003
.195
.010
.164
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Appendix G2
General Regression Model for KIMS Observe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Distinct Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Observe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

11.819
.187
33.030
28.295
-.530
-.750

8.599
.224
25.549
18.075
.632
.462

1.374
.834
1.293
1.565
-.838
-1.625

.176
.408
.202
.124
.406
.110
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Appendix G3
General Regression Model for KIMS Describe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Distinct Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Describe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

7.837
.370
23.981
19.783
-.393
-.755

11.130
.370
26.981
18.064
.861
.688

.704
1.001
.889
1.095
-.456
-1.099

.485
.322
.378
.279
.650
.277
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Appendix G4
General Regression Model for KIMS Act with Awareness and Adult Attachment
Style as Predictors of Distinct Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Act with
Awareness
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

20.168

11.121

1.813

.076

-.051

.399

-.129

.898

55.523
31.163
-1.586
-1.202

19.890
20.544
.711
.760

2.791
1.517
-2.230
-1.581

.007
.136
.030
.120
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Appendix G5
General Regression Model for KIMS Acceptance and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Distinct Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

19.094
-.003
70.614
5.515
-2.176
-.211

9.924
.295
17.284
23.034
.587
.775

1.924
-.010
4.086
.239
-3.706
-.273

.060
.992
.000
.812
.001
.786
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Appendix H1
General Regression Model for MAAS and Adult Attachment Style as Predictors of
Elaborated Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

.380
.013
16.189
8.664
-.229
-.162

2.559
.041
5.191
4.011
.085
.073

.148
.321
3.119
2.160
-2.688
-2.236

.883
.750
.003
.036
.010
.030
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Appendix H2
General Regression Model for KIMS Observe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Elaborated Emotional Articulacy Coefficients
B
(Constant)
KIMS Observe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

.641
.017
6.909
6.252
-.112
-.156

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

1.919
.050
5.701
4.033
.141
.103

.334
.340
1.212
1.550
-.798
-1.517

.740
.735
.231
.128
.429
.136
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Appendix H3
General Regression Model for KIMS Describe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Elaborated Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Describe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

-1.732
.102
5.248
8.050
-.095
-.303

2.421
.080
5.869
3.929
.187
.150

-.715
1.267
.894
2.049
-.508
-2.025

.478
.211
.376
.046
.614
.048
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Appendix H4
General Regression Model for KIMS Act with Awareness and Adult Attachment
Style as Predictors of Elaborated Emotional Articulacy

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

2.384

2.290

1.041

.303

-.041

.082

-.493

.624

13.953
8.587
-.423
-.319

4.095
4.230
.146
.157

3.407
2.030
-2.887
-2.038

.001
.048
.006
.047

B
(Constant)
KIMS Act with
Awareness
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction
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Appendix H5
General Regression Model for KIMS Acceptance and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Elaborated Emotional Articulacy

(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

1.353
-.008
15.861
2.330
-.494
-.067

2.064
.061
3.595
4.791
.122
.161

.656
-.128
4.412
.486
-4.044
-.415

.515
.899
.000
.629
.000
.680
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Appendix I1
General Regression Model for MAAS and Adult Attachment Style as Predictors of
Predictors of Difference in Coherence

(Constant)
MAAS
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

.655
-.014
-1.693
-2.637
.021
.046

1.105
.018
2.241
1.732
.037
.031

.593
-.769
-.755
-1.523
.567
1.459

.556
.446
.454
.134
.573
.151
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Appendix I2
General Regression Model for KIMS Observe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Predictors of Difference in Coherence

(Constant)
KIMS Observe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

.667
-.023
-3.556
-2.411
.080
.059

.731
.019
2.171
1.536
.054
.039

.913
-1.228
-1.638
-1.570
1.494
1.509

.366
.225
.108
.123
.142
.138
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Appendix I3
General Regression Model for KIMS Describe and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Predictors of Difference in Coherence

(Constant)
KIMS Describe
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

1.729
-.065
1.569
-2.561
-.060
.085

.888
.029
2.153
1.442
.069
.055

1.946
-2.216
.729
-1.777
-.877
1.547

.057
.031
.470
.082
.385
.128
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Appendix I4
General Regression Model for KIMS Act with Awareness and Adult Attachment
Style as Predictors of Predictors of Difference in Coherence

(Constant)
KIMS Act with
Awareness
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

-.248

1.049

-.237

.814

.002

.038

.047

.963

-1.225
-1.385
.030
.046

1.876
1.938
.067
.072

-.653
-.715
.446
.648

.517
.478
.658
.520
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Appendix I5
General Regression Model for KIMS Acceptance and Adult Attachment Style as
Predictors of Predictors of Difference in Coherence

(Constant)
KIMS Acceptance
Preoccupied Status
Avoidant Status
Preoccupied Interaction
Avoidant Interaction

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

.456
-.020
-1.833
.924
.048
-.041

.989
.029
1.723
2.296
.059
.077

.461
-.670
-1.064
.402
.823
-.534

.647
.506
.293
.689
.415
.596
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